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“Well, I’m livin’ in a foreign country, but I’m bound to cross the line
Beauty walks a razor’s edge, someday I’ll make it mine
If I could only turn back the clock to when God and her were born
Come in, she said, I’ll give ya
Shelter from the storm.” 1
INTRODUCTION
Many American hearts swell proud at the thought of Emma Lazarus’s
1893 sonnet: “Give me your tired, your poor, your huddled masses
yearning to breathe free . . . .”2 Reading those lines evokes images of its
words emblazoned on the Statue of Liberty as boats holding Irish, Italian,
German, and Polish immigrants float steadily toward Ellis Island, toward
promise and toward prosperity. If that period of history is best captured by
Emma Lazarus, the modern American immigration story more closely
follows the narrative of Bob Dylan’s 1975 Shelter from the Storm. Dylan
tells of a wayward traveler who finds refuge from a raging storm in the
arms and home of a charitable companion. But by the end of the song their
relationship has soured and Dylan pines, alone in a foreign wilderness: “If
I could only turn back the clock to when God and her were born.” 3 If
Lazarus’s vision of generosity defined the era of twentieth-century
European immigration, Dylan’s longing and regret for promises unkept
embodies the plight of the contemporary refugee from Africa, the Middle
East, Central and South America, and Mexico.
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1. BOB DYLAN, Shelter from the Storm, on BLOOD ON THE TRACKS (A&R
Recordings 1975).
2. Emma Lazarus, The New Colossus (1883), reprinted in EMMA LAZARUS:
SELECTED POEMS AND OTHER WRITINGS (Gregory Eiselein ed., 2002).
3. DYLAN, supra note 1.
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Modern American immigration law and policy is one of the most
complex and politicized areas of contemporary civic debate. 4 But its aims
and mission were simpler in the mid-twentieth century domestic and
international landscape: provide a refuge for those yearning to breathe
free; provide a shelter from the storm. American diplomats and
policymakers were key trailblazers in the international community’s
response to budding refugee crises: the United States was one of a few
nations comprising the Ad Hoc Committee precursing the United Nations’
1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (“1951 Refugee
Convention” or “the Convention”) and 1967 Protocol Relating to the
Status of Refugees (“1967 Protocol” or “the Protocol”). 5 The United States
signed and ratified the 1967 Protocol adopting relevant substantive
provisions of the Convention, 6 and accompanying international
documents demonstrate an America singularly focused on protecting
refugees from persecution. 7 The Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”)
and Refugee Act of 1980 independently adopted the Convention and
Protocol as binding domestic statutory law. 8
If international refugee law is a house the United States helped build,
the cornerstone of that house is the principle of non-refoulement. 9 In
application, non-refoulement can be extremely complicated, but its
premise is fairly simple: a state shall not return a refugee to a state where
the refugee will face persecution. 10 In international law, non-refoulement
4. See, e.g., Claire Felter, Danielle Renwick & Amelia Cheatham, The U.S.
Immigration Debate, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELS. (Aug. 31, 2021, 8:00 AM),
https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/us-immigration-debate-0 [https://perma.cc/R3
BK-HVWV].
5. Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Refugees and Stateless Persons,
U.N. Doc. No. E/1850 E/AC.32/8, at 3–4 (Aug. 25, 1950) [hereinafter Ad Hoc
Committee].
6. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 189
U.N.T.S. 137, 197 [hereinafter 1951 Refugee Convention]; Protocol Relating to
the Status of Refugees, January 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 606 U.N.T.S. 267
[hereinafter 1967 Protocol].
7. U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, The Refugee Convention, 1951: The
Travaux Préparatoires Analysed with a Commentary by Dr. Paul Weis (1990),
https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/protection/travaux/4ca34be29/refugee-convention1951-travaux-preparatoires-analysed-commentary-dr-paul.html [https://perma.cc
/W8NC-WQBB] [hereinafter Travaux Préparatoires].
8. Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102; Immigration and
Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163.
9. See, e.g., Travaux Préparatoires, supra note 7, at 9 (“This is a statement
of the principle of non-refoulement, the cornerstone of refugee protection.”).
10. 1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 6, at 176.
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is embodied in Article 33 of the 1951 Refugee Convention as adopted by
the 1967 Protocol. 11 In U.S. domestic law, non-refoulement is mandated
by § 241(b)(3) of the INA through a process called “withholding of
removal,” or simply “withholding.” 12 The INA’s withholding provision
mandates that the Attorney General (“AG”) may not remove an immigrant
to a state in which the immigrant is likely to face persecution.13
Though non-refoulement is the central tenet of international and
domestic refugee law, withholding has become a secondary, oft-forgotten
and seldom-discussed or -granted form of relief for the modern refugee in
America. Instead, immigration judges, the Board of Immigration Appeals
(“BIA”), federal courts, and the academic world have focused almost
singularly on asylum in refugee claims. Asylum is a discretionary form of
relief in which the Attorney General may allow a refugee to remain in the
United States indefinitely.14 Asylum comes from Article 34 of the 1951
Refugee Convention as adopted by the 1967 Protocol, which requires
signatories to attempt to integrate certain refugees into their citizenry.15
Asylum so dominates the legal discussion that it has become common for
federal judges to deny an applicant’s claim for asylum and then deny
withholding with one sentence: the applicant did not meet the standard for
asylum, so they did not meet the standard for withholding. Examples of
these holdings are included in Part IV, infra.
This Article argues that current withholding practice fails to meet the
binding international and domestic standards for non-refoulement.
Specifically, this Article examines refugee claims involving persecution
by private actors and the dearth of withholding analysis by U.S. Circuit
Courts of Appeals in those claims. Private-persecution claims provide a
vantage point to examine America’s failure to uphold non-refoulement
through withholding. Recent BIA and AG decisions have narrowed
applicants’ avenue to asylum in cases of private persecution. Though the
AG does not retain discretion to determine standards for withholding,
withholding and asylum have become so conflated—and the former so oft
subjugated to the latter—that federal courts regularly apply heightened
asylum standards to withholding claims, solidifying a heightened
withholding standard into American law that violates international and
11. Id.; 1967 Protocol, supra note 6.
12. 8 U.S.C.§ 1231(b)(3).
13. Id.
14. 8 U.S.C. § 1158; see also INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 441
(1987) (stating asylum “is a discretionary mechanism”).
15. 1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 6, at 176; see also CardozaFonseca, 480 U.S. at 441 (stating asylum “corresponds to Article 34” of the 1951
Refugee Convention as adopted by the 1967 Protocol).
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domestic refugee law. While the most recent AG decision raising the
standard for private persecution has been vacated, its impact on the federal
courts remains problematic and the future of private persecution standards
is unclear. This Article seeks to demonstrate that American courts’ failure
to properly consider withholding claims causes a break from the
international principle of non-refoulement and withholding at international
and domestic law.
Part I of this Article provides a basic description of the structure and
functions of U.S. refugee law. Part II discusses the 1951 Refugee
Convention and 1967 Protocol, the foundational pillars of international
refugee law. Part III introduces the Immigration and Nationality Act and
Refugee Act of 1980, statutory withholding and asylum, and the U.S.
Supreme Court’s analysis of statutory withholding as the domestic
adoption of international refugee law and non-refoulement. Part III’s
analysis demonstrates U.S. refugee law’s roots in international refugee
law.
Part IV discusses international refugee law’s interpretation of nonrefoulement in claims of private persecution, concluding that refugees
suffering private persecution are entitled to non-refoulement unless their
home state can effectively protect them. Part IV then examines U.S.
treatment of withholding claims for victims of private persecution. First,
this Part examines Executive Office of Immigration Review data on
withholding grants generally over the past 22 years. This Part then
examines all published U.S. Courts of Appeals cases from January 1, 2015,
to June 30, 2020, in which private persecution was central to the court’s
withholding disposition. The agency data and caselaw clearly demonstrate
both a lack of consideration of withholding claims in private-persecution
cases and an impermissible application of heightened asylum standards to
withholding claims.
Part V concludes that the U.S. has failed to adhere to international and
domestic refugee law and proposes a remedy in the form of a separate
withholding analysis in all refugee claims. To comply with international
and domestic law, U.S. administrative agencies and courts must engage in
a separate withholding analysis in private-persecution cases in order to
determine whether the home state can offer effective protection. This
Article proposes that our nation’s immigration system do for the refugee
what Dylan’s weary traveler could not: “turn back the clock” to a time
when our domestic withholding practice complied with the binding
principal of non-refoulement.
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I. U.S. REFUGEE LAW AT A GLANCE
U.S. immigration law can be daunting. For lawyers and non-lawyers
alike, it can be as administratively and legally complex as it is emotionally
and politically wrought. This Article is not a treatise on immigration law,
nor is it a comprehensive examination of immigration law or even refugee
law generally. Rather, this Part seeks to provide a basic understanding of
some typical refugee claims and the manner in which those claims might
be processed and decided within the United States. A more comprehensive
description of the INA and its relevant provisions will be provided in Part
II. Part I aims to provide a sufficient base for the reader to understand the
analysis in Parts II, III, IV, and V.
A. Forms of Refugee Relief: Asylum, Withholding, and CAT Relief
When an alien enters the United States illegally and is apprehended,
the Department of Homeland Security will generally initiate removal
proceedings. 16 If the alien is found removable and does not raise a claim
for relief, the alien will be forcibly removed to the nation of origin or
citizenship. 17 Aliens may contest removability, or they may concede
removability and claim some form of refugee protection entitling them to
either remain in the United States or be removed somewhere other than
the nation of origin or citizenship. 18
The three major forms of refugee protection are asylum, withholding
of removal, and relief under the U.N. Convention Against Torture (“CAT
relief”). 19 Asylum and withholding will be discussed in greater detail
throughout this Article, but a brief description in this Part is warranted.
Withholding does not entitle a refugee to remain in the United States but
prohibits the AG from removing the alien to a state where it is more likely
than not that the alien will suffer persecution. 20 Withholding requires the
applicant to meet a higher likelihood-of-harm standard than asylum, 21
which only requires an alien to demonstrate a well-founded fear of
persecution upon return to the nation of origin. 22 A grant of asylum permits
16. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a); id. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i).
17. Id. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i).
18. Id.
19. Id. § 1231(b)(3); id. § 1158; 8 C.F.R. § 208.18 (2021).
20. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3).
21. Id.
22. Id. § 1158; see also INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 428–34
(1987) (discussing different likelihood-of-harm standards for withholding and
asylum).

2022] NON-REFOULEMENT, WITHHOLDING, AND PRIVATE PERSECUTION 739

a refugee to remain in the United States indefinitely.23 Finally, CAT relief
prohibits the AG from returning a refugee to a state in which the refugee
will face torture. 24
Typically, aliens with viable refugee claims will apply for all three
forms of relief. 25 Upon apprehension, such aliens might generally concede
removability and argue that they are entitled to asylum, withholding, and
CAT relief. 26 In these claims, the aliens are not denying that they are in
the United States illegally and subject to removal, but instead argue that
they should remain in the United States or not be removed to a particular
country because they are refugees. 27 An immigration judge (“IJ”) will first
rule on the application, granting or denying in whole or in part. 28 Both the
alien applicant and the Department of Homeland Security may appeal the
IJ’s decision to the Board of Immigration Appeals. 29 The BIA will affirm
or overturn the IJ’s decision. 30 The BIA reviews the IJ’s legal conclusions
de novo and its factual conclusions for clear error. 31 U.S. Circuit Courts of
Appeals are then statutorily authorized to review the BIA’s legal
conclusions de novo, but factual determinations may only be reviewed
under a highly deferential substantial-evidence standard. 32 A circuit court
may not overturn a factual determination, such as whether a particular
applicant suffered past persecution, “unless any adjudicator would be
compelled to conclude to the contrary.”33
B. Attorney General Discretion in Asylum Cases
Understanding the AG’s discretion in asylum cases and lack thereof
in withholding cases is important to this Article’s analysis. Whereas
withholding is a mandatory form of relief for eligible refugees, the AG has
23. Id. § 1158.
24. 8 C.F.R. § 208.18 (2021).
25. See, e.g., Prieto-Pineda v. Barr, 960 F.3d 516, 516–17 (8th Cir. 2020)
(involving alien conceding removability and applying for asylum, withholding,
and CAT relief).
26. See, e.g., id.
27. See, e.g., id.
28. 8 C.F.R. § 3.0 (2021).
29. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1 (2021).
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B).
33. Id.; see also NLRB v. Columbian Enameling & Stamping Co., 306 U.S.
292, 300 (1939) (describing “substantial evidence” as merely “more than a
scintilla”).
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discretion to grant or deny asylum to applicants. 34 Essentially, the AG may
deny an otherwise eligible asylum applicant’s petition for asylum based
on any number of reasons. 35 It arguably follows that the authority to deny
claims outright necessarily entails the authority to raise standards for
grants of asylum generally: the AG could raise asylum eligibility standards
based on the justification that he or she is denying all claims below that
heightened standard as a matter of discretion. But this is not the case for
withholding, which is a mandatory form of relief. 36 Because the AG does
not retain discretion to deny otherwise meritorious withholding
applications, 37 it does not follow that he or she may raise the standard for
grants of withholding. This distinction is central to this Article’s point:
withholding and asylum are so conflated in U.S. practice—and
withholding analysis so often bootstrapped to asylum analysis in one
sentence, if not completely neglected—that federal courts impermissibly
apply standards for asylum, heightened under the AG’s discretion, to
withholding claims.
C. Refugee Definitions and Persecution
For an alien to receive refugee protection, the alien must be
determined to be a “refugee.” 38 In U.S. domestic law, a refugee is an alien
who is unable or unwilling to return to his or her home nation due to a
well-founded fear of future persecution. 39 If an alien can demonstrate past

34. See, e.g., INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 429, 441 (1987) (“Thus,
as made binding on the United States through the Protocol, Article 34 provides
for a precatory, or discretionary, benefit for the entire class of persons who qualify
as ‘refugees,’ whereas Article 33.1 provides an entitlement for the subcategory
that ‘would be threatened’ with persecution upon their return.”).
35. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(h)(1) (2021); see also Caroline Holliday, Making
Domestic Violence Private Again: Referral Authority and Rights Rollback in
Matter of A-B-, 60 B.C. L. REV. 2145, 2157 (2019) (“In line with this broad
authority, the Attorney General has the ability to refer cases issued by the BIA to
himself for review and adjudication. The regulations do not specify any limits on
the kinds of cases the Attorney General can review, and they do not mandate
specific referral procedures.”).
36. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3); Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 441.
37. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3); Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 441.
38. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3); id. § 1158; 8 C.F.R. § 208.18 (2021); see also INS
v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 425–30 (1984) (discussing relief as applicable to
refugees).
39. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42).
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persecution, there is a presumption that the alien has a well-founded fear
of future persecution. 40
“Persecution” is vaguely defined both at international and U.S.
domestic law. 41 Drafters of the 1951 Refugee Convention and 1967
Protocol declined to provide a clear definition or framework for
determining persecution. 42 U.S. federal courts have recognized it as “illdefined,” “elusive,” and “protean” 43 and have either struggled or declined
to adopt a unified voice in describing persecution. 44 For purposes of this
Article, whether a particular harm or threat constitutes persecution can be
broken down into three criteria: (1) severity of harm, (2) protected
category and nexus, and (3) government involvement.
The first criterion asks whether the harm suffered or feared is severe
enough to constitute persecution. This Article is not primarily concerned
with the ongoing debate seeking to pinpoint the threshold for severity of
harm, 45 and selected case studies in Part IV do not turn on severity of harm.
The second criterion, protected category and nexus, is a frequently
scrutinized, dispositive, and controversial element in determining whether
an alien has suffered persecution, particularly so in cases of aliens fleeing
domestic or gang violence at the southern border. 46 In order to qualify for
refugee protection at international law, an alien must suffer persecution
40. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1) (2021); id. § 1208.16(b)(1) (2021).
41. See, e.g., Scott Rempell, Defining Persecution, 2013 UTAH L. REV. 283,
284 (2013) (discussing difficulty defining “persecution” in law and scholarship)
[hereinafter Rempell, Defining Persecution].
42. See 1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 6 (failing to include definition
of refugee).
43. Rempell, Defining Persecution, supra note 41, at 284 (first quoting Haile
v. Gonzales, 421 F.3d 493, 496 (7th Cir. 2005); then quoting Pathmakanthan v.
Holder, 612 F.3d 618, 622 (7th Cir. 2010); and then quoting Bocova v. Gonzales,
412 F.3d 257, 263 (1st Cir. 2005)).
44. See, e.g., Scott Rempell, Asylum Discord: Disparities in Persecution
Assessments, 15 NEV. L.J. 142, 145–49 (2014) (discussing differences in
persecution analysis across federal courts).
45. See, e.g., Rempell, Defining Persecution, supra note 41, at 300–18
(examining severity of harm in determining persecution generally).
46. See, e.g., Theresa A. Vogel, Critiquing Matter of A-B-: An Uncertain
Future in Asylum proceedings for Women Fleeing Intimate Partner Violence, 52
U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 343, 383–96 (2019) (discussing the impact of particularsocial-group analysis on refugee claims for those fleeing domestic violence);
Benjamin H. Harville, Ensuring Protection or Opening the Floodgates?: Refugee
Law and Its Application to Those Fleeing Drug Violence in Mexico, 27 GEO.
IMMIGR. L.J. 135, 151–57 (2012) (discussing impact of particular-social-group
analysis on claims for those fleeing gang violence in Mexico).
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“on account of his [or her] race, religion, nationality, membership of a
particular social group or political opinion.”47 In the United States, “on
account of” has been interpreted to mean that race, religion, nationality,
membership in a particular social group, or political opinion must be at
least one central reason for the infliction of harm. 48 This criterion, and
principally what constitutes a “particular social group,” is subject to
considerable scholarly debate. 49 However, this Article is not primarily
concerned with protected-category-and-nexus analysis as it relates to
grants of withholding.
Finally, and central to the analysis in this Article, is the criterion of
government involvement. International and domestic refugee law offers
protection only to those aliens fleeing harm inflicted by government actors
or by private actors that the alien’s home government cannot or will not
control. 50 In cases of non-governmental persecution, the alien must prove
additional arguments to be entitled to refugee relief: in order for private
conduct to constitute persecution entitling an alien to refugee relief, the
alien’s home state must be unwilling or unable to offer protection. 51
Whether an applicant’s home government is unwilling or unable to
protect the applicant from a particular harm can be central to a grant or
denial of refugee relief: an otherwise eligible alien who shows severity and
nexus but cannot demonstrate that the applicant’s home state is unable or
unwilling to protect him or her will not be entitled to refugee relief and
will be removed. 52 The significance of private-persecution analysis has
grown and will continue to grow with the rising rates of persecution claims
based on domestic and gang violence in South and Central America and
47. 1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 6, at 176; 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42).
48. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B); see also 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.13(a), 208.16(b),
1208.13a, 1208.16(b), 1240.11(c)(3)(iii), 1240.33(c)(3), 1240.49(c)(4)(iii)
(2021).
49. See, e.g., Vogel, supra note 46, at 383–96.
50. See, e.g., Grace v. Barr, 965 F.3d 883, 889 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (citing
Bringas-Rodriguez v. Sessions, 850 F.3d 1051, 1060 (9th Cir. 2017) (en banc))
(“In order to obtain asylum [or withholding] based on persecution by non-state
actors, applicants must show that their governments were ‘unable or unwilling to
control’ the persecutors”); see also Elsa M. Bullard, Insufficient Government
Protection: The Inescapable Element in Domestic Violence Asylum Cases, 95
MINN. L. REV. 1867, 1889–91 (2011) (discussing unwilling-or-unable standard in
American, Canadian, and British courts).
51. See, e.g., Grace, 965 F.3d at 889.
52. See, e.g., K. H. v. Barr, 920 F.3d 470, 479 (6th Cir. 2019) (denying
petition for review based on finding that Guatemalan government was not
unwilling or unable to protect applicant).
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Mexico. 53 Many of the claims arising from these countries involve aliens
fleeing private persecutors, either domestic partners or members of local
or national gangs operating in a culture or climate of government inaction
rather than participation. 54
The unwilling-or-unable standard evades uniform definition: in 2018,
the Attorney General defined the unwilling-or-unable standard to require
“that the government condoned the private actions ‘or at least
demonstrated a complete helplessness to protect the victims.’”55 Though
the 2018 AG decision has since been vacated, 56 some circuits have adopted
this heightened standard, ruling it to be a reasonable definition, and
continue to apply the heightened standard as precedent. 57 The international
community and other circuits have set a lower unwilling-or-unable

53. Of the 30 cases in the dataset discussed in Part IV, infra, 17 involve
applicants fleeing domestic abuse or gang violence in Central and Southern
America or Mexico: Galloso v. Barr, 954 F.3d 1189 (8th Cir. 2020) (domestic
violence in Mexico); Hernandez-Chacon v. Barr, 948 F.3d 94 (2d Cir. 2020) (gang
violence in El Salvador); Prieto-Pineda v. Barr, 960 F.3d 516 (8th Cir. 2020);
Orellana v. Barr, 925 F.3d 145 (4th Cir. 2019) (domestic violence in El Salvador);
Gonzales-Veliz v. Barr, 938 F.3d 219 (5th Cir. 2019) (domestic violence in
Honduras); Juarez-Coronado v. Barr, 919 F.3d 1085 (8th Cir. 2019) (domestic
violence in Guatemala); Martin Martin v. Barr, 916 F.3d 1141 (8th Cir. 2019)
(gang violence in Guatemala); Villalta-Martinez v. Sessions, 882 F.3d 20 (1st Cir.
2018) (gang violence in El Salvador); Olmos-Colaj v. Sessions, 886 F.3d 168 (1st
Cir. 2018) (gang violence in Guatemala); C.J.L.G. v. Sessions, 880 F.3d 1122 (9th
Cir. 2018) (gang violence in Honduras); Justo v. Sessions, 895 F.3d 154 (1st Cir.
2018) (gang violence in Mexico); Zavaleta-Policiano v. Sessions, 873 F.3d 241
(4th Cir. 2017) (gang violence in El Salvador); Morales-Morales v. Sessions, 857
F.3d 130 (1st Cir. 2017) (gang violence in Guatemala); Vega-Ayala v. Lynch, 833
F.3d 34 (1st Cir. 2016) (domestic violence in El Salvador); Cinto-Velasquez v.
Lynch, 817 F.3d 602 (8th Cir. 2016) (gang violence in Guatemala); Saldana v.
Lynch, 820 F.3d 970 (8th Cir. 2016) (gang violence in Mexico); HernandezAvalos v. Lynch, 784 F.3d 944 (4th Cir. 2015) (gang violence in El Salvador).
54. See cases cited supra note 53.
55. Matter of A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316, 337 (2018) (internal citation
omitted).
56. Matter of A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316.
57. See, e.g., Gonzales-Veliz, 938 F.3d at 223–24 (applying and adopting
standard from Matter of A-B-); see also Ramirez-De Requeno v. Garland, No. 193201, 2022 U.S. App. LEXIS 4083, at *4 (Feb. 15, 2022) (continuing to adhere
to Matter of A-B- heightened standard as precedent for its continued application
in the Second Circuit after vacation of the Matter of A-B- decision).
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standard, focusing instead on whether the alien’s home state is actually
able and willing to offer real, effective, and meaningful protection. 58
D. Withholding and Private Persecution: A Distinct Vantage Point
The application of multiple standards for private persecution is a key
focus of this Article. Differing standards for private persecution in
American law can be inherently problematic and unfair: if two aliens flee
identical circumstances but are apprehended in different regions of the
country, one may be returned to face death or injury while the other is
allowed to remain in the United States. But this Article will focus on the
problematic application of heightened standards across multiple forms of
refugee claims for relief.
As discussed in Section C of Part IV, the AG may have authority to
raise the standard for private persecution in asylum claims. Whatever
disparate and unfair outcomes arise from differing and heightened
standards for private persecution in asylum claims, the AG has discretion
to grant or deny asylum, and it arguably follows that he or she may raise
the standard for entitlement to asylum. But eligible refugees are entitled to
withholding of removal by statute, and the AG does not have discretion to
grant or deny withholding or determine standards for withholding. 59 When
IJs, the BIA, and federal courts deny private-persecution claims for
withholding based on a heightened condoned-or-complete-helplessness
discretionary standard that the AG has mandated for asylum claims, they
deny withholding claims that should be entitled to relief. As will be
discussed throughout this Article, withholding of removal is the domestic
embodiment of non-refoulement, so the misapplication of a heightened
standard for asylum to withholding claims violates the United States’
statutory and constitutional treaty obligations under the 1951 Refugee
Convention, the 1967 Protocol, the Immigration and Nationality Act, and
the Refugee Act of 1980.
58. See, e.g., U.N. High Comm’r. for Refugees, United Nations Handbook
on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status and Guidelines on
International Protection, ¶ 65, U.N. Doc. HCR/IP/4/Eng/Rev.4 (Feb. 2019),
https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/publications/legal/5ddfcdc47/handbook-procedures
-criteria-determining-refugee-status-under-1951-convention.html [https://perma
.cc/4NV9-5LDK] (requiring government to provide “effective protection” at
international law) [hereinafter U.N. Handbook]; Antonio v. Barr, 959 F.3d 778,
793 (6th Cir. 2020) (finding persecution where applicant cannot “reasonably rely”
on effective protection from government).
59. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3); INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 441
(1987).
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Standards for asylum and withholding are conflated generally, 60 not
just in private-persecution cases. But private-persecution claims provide a
particularly effective vantage point to examine improper withholding
analysis because the AG’s 2018 Matter of A-B- decision clearly raised the
unwilling-or-unable standard for private persecution. 61 Though the AG’s
authority to raise the unwilling-or-unable standard is, at most, limited to
asylum claims, this Article tracks courts that have adopted the standard
and impermissibly applied it to withholding. 62 Though the current AG
vacated Matter of A-B- on June 16, 2021, 63 some circuits continue to
adhere to a heightened standard either by having adopting the Matter of AB- standard into circuit canon or through independent, sometimes preexisting jurisprudence. 64 The AG opinion vacating Matter of A-B- bases
its decision in part on forthcoming agency rules establishing uniform
standards for private persecution claims, 65 and it is unclear if those rules
will mirror the standard for non-refoulement.
II. INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE LAW AND U.S. TREATY OBLIGATIONS
As discussed in Part I, this Article does not discuss all or most aspects
of refugee law but provides a foundation to discuss the discrete issue of
non-refoulement and the failure of the American immigration system to
adhere to its international and domestic obligation to properly analyze
refugee claims for withholding eligibility. Part II provides a general
outline of international refugee law as created by the 1951 Refugee
Convention and the 1967 Protocol. It specifically examines Articles 33
and 34, which provide the bases for withholding and asylum respectively.
Finally, this Part briefly discusses the constitutionally binding nature of
treaty obligations at domestic law.
60. See infra note 253 (discussing one-line rejection of withholding claims in
claims where asylum is denied in American jurisprudence).
61. Matter of A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 337.
62. See infra note 253.
63. Matter of A-B-, Respondent, 28 I. & N. Dec. 307 (2021).
64. See, e.g., Scarlett v. Barr, 957 F.3d 316, 331–34 (2d Cir. 2020); see also
Ramirez-De Requeno v. Garland, No. 19-3201, 2022 U.S. App. LEXIS 4083, at
*4 (continuing to apply the heightened standard after A-B-‘s vacation); see also
Olmos-Colaj v. Sessions, 886 F.3d 168, 176 (1st Cir. 2018) (independently raising
standard for private persecution); Saldana v. Lynch, 820 F.3d 970, 977 (8th Cir.
2016) (independently raising standard for private persecution); Galina v. INS, 213
F.3d 955, 958 (7th Cir. 2000) (independently raising standard for private
persecution).
65. Matter of A-B-, Respondent, 28 I. & N. Dec. at 308.
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A. The 1951 Refugee Convention and the 1967 Protocol Generally
International refugee law is a product of the post-World War II
international landscape, in which the United Nations recognized an
emerging set of primarily-European refugee crises and developed a regime
to meet the challenge. 66 The first step in developing an international
refugee-law framework was the 1950 Ad Hoc Committee on Refugees and
Stateless Persons (“Ad Hoc Committee”). 67 The Ad Hoc Committee
included members from Belgium, Brazil, Canada, China, Denmark,
France, Israel, Turkey, the United Kingdom, the United States, Venezuela,
Italy, Switzerland, and various non-governmental organizations.68
Understanding the need to combat refugee crises, but also the unique
burdens that might be placed on certain countries without international
cooperation, the Ad Hoc Committee called upon members of the
international community to create an interconnected framework for
combatting refugee crises. 69 The Ad Hoc Committee also developed a
definition of “refugee” that was adopted in major part by the subsequent
Convention and Protocol:
For the purposes of this Convention, the term “refugee” shall
apply to any person . . . who has had, or has, well-founded fear of
being the victim of persecution for reasons of race, religion,
nationality or political opinion . . . or circumstances directly
resulting from such events, and owing to such fear, has had to
leave, shall leave, or remains outside the country of his
nationality . . . and is unable, or owing to such fear or for reasons
other than personal convenience unwilling, to avail himself of the
protection of the government of the country of his nationality, or,
if he has no nationality, has left, shall leave, or remains outside the
country of his former habitual residence. 70
Articles 28 and 29 of the Ad Hoc Committee’s report served as
precursors to the non-refoulement and naturalization provisions of Articles
33 and 34 of the 1951 Refugee Convention. Article 28 states, “No
Contracting State shall expel or return a refugee in any manner whatsoever
to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened

66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

Travaux Préparatoires, supra note 7, at Foreword.
Ad Hoc Committee, supra note 5.
Id. at 3–4.
Id. at 6–7.
Id. at 8.
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on account of his race, religion, nationality or political opinion.” 71 Article
28 demonstrates that refugee law was founded on a broad vision of nonrefoulement: from its earliest days, refugee law contemplated that states
refrain in any manner whatsoever from returning refugees to face the
threat of death or injury. 72 Article 29 states, “The Contracting States shall
as far as possible facilitate the assimilation and naturalization of refugees.
They shall in particular make every effort to expedite naturalization
proceedings and to reduce as far as possible the charges and costs of such
proceedings.” 73 This is the precursor to naturalization protections at
international law and asylum at U.S. domestic law.74
One year later, a group of 20 nations signed the 1951 Convention on
Refugees, codifying international refugee protections, including the
principles of non-refoulement and naturalization. 75 The Convention itself
cites back to the Ad Hoc Committee as forming the “basis of its
discussions in the draft Convention.”76 The broad aims of the Convention
are spelled out explicitly in its opening:
The Conference . . . [r]ecommends that Governments continue to
receive refugees in their territories and that they act in concert in
a true spirit of international cooperation in order that these
refugees may find asylum and the possibility of resettlement. The
Conference [e]xpresses the hope that the Convention relating to
the Status of Refugees will have value as an example exceeding
its contractual scope and that all nations will be guided by it in
granting so far as possible to persons in their territory as refugees
and who would not be covered by the terms of the Convention, the
treatment for which it provides.77
This language clearly establishes the 1951 Refugee Convention as a
baseline and sets the expectation that all nations grant refugee claims “as
far as possible to persons in their territory . . . who would not be covered
by the terms of the Convention . . . .” 78 Of course this is important because
the foundational instrument establishing modern international refugee law
interprets itself as necessarily being subject to growth and expanded
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

Id. at 25.
See id.
Id. at art. 29.
Compare id., with 1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 6, at 176.
1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 6, at 186–97.
Id. at 142.
Id. at 148.
Id.
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protections. In another relevant sense, when this Article discusses the
failure to comply with the principle of non-refoulement or other key
provisions of the Convention and Protocol, this language demonstrates just
how clearly violative of international law that failure is: if the Convention
and Protocol are absolute baselines for compliance with international law,
there is little room for doubt that violation of its provisions or failure to
live up to the principles it announces are clear violations.
The 1951 Refugee Convention defines “refugee” with substantial
similarity to the Ad Hoc Committee, as any person who,
owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of
race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group
or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is
unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the
protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and
being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a
result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling
to return to it. 79
The 1951 Refugee Convention definition is perhaps even broader than
the Ad Hoc Committee’s, removing the limitation that the refugee’s
inability or unwillingness to return not be caused by “personal
convenience.” 80 The Travaux Préparatoires, supporting papers that
document the drafters’ intent in an international legal document,81 do not
directly address this minor change in the definition of “refugee,” 82 but
removing criteria for eligibility without other change necessarily broadens
the scope of the definition and entitlement to protection.
However, the 1951 Refugee Convention limited its definition of
“refugee” to those whose refugee status resulted from events occurring
before January 1, 1951. 83 Perhaps due to a singular focus on post-WWII
refugee crises rather than addressing refugee claims arising in the future,
the 1951 Refugee Convention alone was insufficient to create a
comprehensive refugee-law scheme for future claims. 84 Therefore, the
international community, seeking to establish such a scheme, developed

79. Id. at art. 1.
80. Id.; compare 1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 6, with Ad Hoc
Committee, supra note 5, at Ch. II, ¶ A.
81. Travaux Préparatoires, supra note 7.
82. Id. at art. 1.
83. 1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 6, at art. 1.
84. 1967 Protocol, supra note 6, at 268.
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the subsequent 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees. 85 The
1967 Protocol eliminated the “before January 1, 1951” language from the
definition of “refugee,” which extended protections for claims after
January 1, 1951, and encompassed prospective claims for refugee relief. 86
The 1967 Protocol incorporates Articles 2 through 34, applying those
articles’ protections to all meritorious refugee claims. 87
B. Articles 33 and 34: Non-refoulement and Naturalization
Articles 33 and 34 of the 1951 Refugee Convention and 1967 Protocol
establish the international principles of non-refoulement and
naturalization. 88 Non-refoulement is both the principle of international law
most central to this Article and the foundational element of international
refugee law generally. 89 It is the key protection afforded to refugees and
the foundation for withholding of removal at U.S. domestic law. 90
Naturalization is far more aspirational in language and requires good-faith
efforts from states to naturalize refugees. 91 Naturalization provides the
foundation for asylum at U.S. domestic law. 92 The relationships between
non-refoulement, naturalization, withholding of removal, and asylum are
discussed at greater length in Part III.
Article 33 codifies non-refoulement: “No Contracting State shall expel
or return (“refouler”) a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers
or territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of
his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or
political opinion.”93 The definition is identical to its Ad Hoc Committee
precursor with the addition of the particular-social-group protected

85. Id.
86. Id. at art. I.
87. Id.
88. 1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 6, at art. 33, 34.
89. See, e.g., Travaux Préparatoires, supra note 7, at Introduction (“This is a
statement of the principle of non-refoulement, the cornerstone of refugee
protection.”); INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 440 (1987) (stating that
withholding corresponds to non-refoulement).
90. Id.
91. See 1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 6, at art. 34 (“The Contracting
States shall as far as possible facilitate the assimilation and naturalization of
refugees.”).
92. See, e.g., Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 441 (stating that asylum is
derived from art. 34 naturalization).
93. 1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 6, at art. 33.
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characteristic. 94 Notably retained in the definition is the “in any manner
whatsoever” language emphasizing the broad scope of non-refoulement. 95
Article 33 requires states party to the 1951 Refugee Convention or the
1967 Protocol to refrain from returning refugees to any nation where they
are likely to face persecution. 96 Article 34 codifies naturalization at
international law, with no change in language from the Ad Hoc
Committee’s definition a year earlier. 97
Part III of this Article will discuss the relationship between nonrefoulement and withholding as well as naturalization and asylum at
greater length. Part IV will address the scope of non-refoulement, its
centrality to the international refugee law regime, and its applicability to
private persecution.
C. U.S. Treaty Obligations
Article VI, the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution,
dictates that “all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and
the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the
Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.”98
Treaty obligations, along with provisions of the U.S. Constitution and
federal statutes, are domestically binding and superior in authority to state
or local law. 99 Because the United States signed and ratified the 1967
Protocol, 100 its provisions, which incorporate Articles 33 and 34 of the
1951 Refugee Convention, are binding domestic law. 101 Federal agencies
and courts are constitutionally bound by treaty provisions to which the
United States has acceded through ratification, including the principle of
non-refoulement as established by Article 33 of the 1951 Refugee
94. Id.; compare 1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 6, at art. 33, with Ad
Hoc Committee, supra note 5, at art. 28.
95. See id.; see also, Diane Uchimiya, Falling Through the Cracks, 23
BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J. 109, 132 (2013) (“Keeping in mind refugee protection
as the Convention’s objective, a liberal interpretation of the criteria and a strict
application of the limited exceptions are called for.” (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
96. 1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 6, at art. 33.
97. Id. at art. 34.
98. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
99. Id.
100. Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, S. TREATY DOC. No. 90–27
(1968).
101. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
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Convention and 1967 Protocol. 102 Failure to uphold the principle of nonrefoulement is a violation not just of international law, but of the U.S.
Constitution.
As Parts III, IV, and V discuss the U.S. immigration system and
federal courts’ failure to properly apply the principle of non-refoulement
through improper or insufficient application of withholding analysis, it is
necessary to understand the importance of treaty obligations at U.S. law.
International law’s place, impact, and force at U.S. domestic law can be
controversial, dynamic, and uncertain: one hundred scholars might
provide one hundred different opinions on the force and effect of
international law on domestic law. However, when the United States has
signed and ratified a treaty, its provisions are binding under the
Constitution. 103 When subsequent Parts of this Article discuss failure to
uphold the principle of non-refoulement, the failure to adhere to the 1951
Refugee Convention and the 1967 Protocol is a violation of the U.S.
Constitution.
III. THE INA AND INTERNATIONAL ROOTS OF DOMESTIC REFUGEE LAW
While Part II touched on U.S. constitutional treaty obligations to
adhere to non-refoulement, this Part examines the legislative
implementation of that requirement through passage of the Immigration
and Nationality Act and the Refugee Act of 1980. Part III also analyzes
the close connection to U.S. refugee legislation and its international
foundation, as viewed through the lens of legislative history, executive
agency practice, and Supreme Court precedent.
A. The INA: Refugees, Withholding, and Asylum
Bound to provisions of the 1951 Refugee Convention through
ratification of the 1967 Protocol, the U.S. brought its refugee-claimadjudication system into conformity with binding treaty law through the
Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952104 and the Refugee Act of
1980. 105 The Refugee Act of 1980 was an important amendment to the
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat.
163.
105. Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, § 207, 94 Stat. 102, 103; see
also Maddie Boyd, Refuge from Violence: A Global Comparison of the Treatment
of Domestic Violence Asylum Claims, 29 BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J. 1, 4 (2018)
(“Many States that have ratified the Convention have included the Convention’s
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INA, establishing permanent procedures and offices to administer refugee
claims and bringing the INA into greater compliance with international
law. 106 This Article’s references to the INA are to the modern INA, as
amended by the Refugee Act of 1980. The INA codified the major
protections of the 1951 Refugee Convention, including the Convention’s
definition of “refugee,” the principle of non-refoulement, and
naturalization aims. 107
The INA adopts a definition of “refugee” substantially similar to the
1951 Refugee Convention and 1967 Protocol. 108 Section 241(b)(3)
incorporates non-refoulement into the United States Code in the form of
withholding of removal. 109 Subject to limited exceptions,110 “the Attorney
General may not remove an alien to a country if the Attorney General
decides that the alien’s life or freedom would be threatened in that country
because of the alien’s race, religion, nationality, membership in a
particular social group, or political opinion.”111 Applications for
withholding of removal “shall be granted if the applicant’s eligibility for
withholding is established.” 112 Withholding is a mandatory form of relief
for eligible applicants, and the AG does not retain discretion to deny

definition of a refugee within their own legal systems. For example, the U.S.
Congress passed the Refugee Act in 1980, which incorporated the U.N. definition
of a refugee into the Immigration and Nationality Act”).
106. See Refugee Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102, at Title I—
Purpose.
107. 8 U.S.C. §§ 31, 32; see also Boyd, supra note 105, at 4.
108. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42):
[A]ny person who is outside any country of such person’s nationality, or
in the case of a person having no nationality, is outside any country in
which such person last habitually resided, and who is unable or unwilling
to return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the
protection of, that country because of persecution or a well-founded fear
of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a
particular social group, or political opinion . . . .
109. Id. § 1231(b)(3).
110. Id. § 1231(b)(3)(B) describes some exceptions to eligibility for
withholding. Excepted aliens who may not receive withholding include: (1) an
alien who has participated in Nazi persecution, genocide, extrajudicial killings, or
torture; (2) aliens who have themselves assisted or committed acts of persecution
based on a protected ground; (3) aliens convicted of serious crimes within the
United States; (4) aliens who have committed serious nonpolitical crimes outside
the United States; and (5) aliens who present a national security risk.
111. Id.
112. 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(d)(1) (2021) (emphasis added).
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withholding to an applicant meeting the statutory and international law
standards for withholding and non-refoulement. 113
The INA also codifies Article 34’s naturalization provision as
domestic asylum. 114 Section 208 states:
The Secretary of Homeland Security or the Attorney General may
grant asylum to an alien who has applied for asylum in accordance
with the requirements and procedures established by the Secretary
of Homeland Security or the Attorney General under this section
if the Secretary of Homeland Security or the Attorney General
determines that such alien is a refugee within the meaning of
section 1101(a)(42)(A) of this title. 115
Any refugee is eligible for asylum as a general matter, but certain
substantive and procedural exceptions apply: refugees who may be safely
removed to a third country, who have committed aggravated felonies, who
fail to apply for asylum within one year of arrival to the United States, and
who have previously been denied asylum—absent changed
circumstances—are not eligible for asylum relief. 116 Aliens carry the
burden of demonstrating that they are refugees entitled to asylum. 117 In
addition to the “may grant” language demonstrating AG discretion in
asylum application determination, the INA specifically grants the
Attorney General authority to “establish additional limitations and
conditions . . . under which an alien shall be ineligible for asylum.” 118
B. International Roots of Domestic Refugee Law: Executive Agencies
Scholars, federal judges, and the BIA acknowledge that the American
system of refugee relief is intended to implement and comply with
internationally recognized human rights and refugee protections
established at international law.119 As discussed in Section C, the U.S.
113. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3); 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(d)(1) (2021); INS v. CardozaFonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 480 (1987).
114. 8 U.S.C. § 1158; Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 441.
115. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(A).
116. Id. § 1158(a)(2), (b)(2)(B)(i).
117. Id. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i).
118. Id. § 1158(b)(2)(C).
119. See, e.g., Katelyn Massetta-Alvarez, Tearing Down the Wall Between
Refuge and Gang-Based Asylum Seekers: Why the United States Should
Reconsider Its Stance on Central American Gang-Based Asylum Claims, 50 CASE
W. RES. J. INT’L L. 337, 386–87 (2018) (first citing Mirdita v. Gonzales, 237 F.
App’x 691 (2d Cir. 2007); then citing Pieschacon-Villegas v. Att’y Gen. of the
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Supreme Court has explicitly stated that the withholding and asylum
provisions of the INA embody Articles 33 and 34 of the 1951 Refugee
Convention and 1967 Protocol. The Department of Justice and the
Department of State also acknowledge that international law forms both
the foundation for U.S. refugee law and serves as a guide for interpreting
refugee claims. 120
The BIA considers State Department country reports as evidence of
country conditions and past persecution, and those reports are based in part
on standards from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other
international human rights treaties.121 The AG requires U.S. Citizenship
and Immigration Services (“USCIS”) officers to receive training in
international human rights law, 122 and USCIS considers international law
in resolving refugee claims.123 The USCIS training manual states that
international humanitarian law provides guidance in determining whether
harms amount to persecution. 124
C. International Roots of Domestic Refugee Law: Stevic and CardozaFonseca
If the constitutional authority of treaty obligations, federal statutes
incorporating international refugee law, and agency reliance on
international law leave room for debate over the foundational impact and
binding nature of the 1951 Refugee Convention and 1967 Protocol on U.S.
law, two U.S. Supreme Court cases definitively resolve the issue. The
Supreme Court’s 1984 decision in INS v. Stevic resolved the likelihoodU.S., 671 F.3d 303, 313 (3d Cir. 2011); then citing Galina v. INS, 213 F.3d 955,
957 (7th Cir. 2000); then citing Perkovic v. INS, 33 F.3d 615, 623 (6th Cir. 1994);
and then citing In re Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357, 377 (B.I.A. 1996)).
120. Id. at 387.
121. Id. (first citing Matter of A-R-C-G- et al., 26 I. & N. Dec. 388, 393–94
(B.I.A. 2014); then citing Sadik v. Gonzales, 172 F. App’x 694 (8th Cir. 2006);
then citing Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2015—Secretary’s
Preface, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (2015), https://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/
humanrightsreport/index.htm#wrapper [https://perma.cc/8R7J-BUH5]; and then
citing USCIS to Take Action to Address Asylum Backlog, U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND
IMMIGR. SERV. (Jan. 31, 2018), https://www.uscis.gov/news/news-releases/uscistake-action-address-asylum-backlog [https://perma.cc/K5AS-MU9E]).
122. Id.
123. Id. at 387–88 (citing 8 C.F.R. §208.1(b) (2021)).
124. Id. (citing U.S. Citizenship and Immigr. Serv., Asylum Officer Basic
Training Course: International Human Rights Law, AMERICAN IMMIGR. LAW.
ASS’N (Mar. 1, 2005), https://www.aila.org/infonet/aobtc-international-humanrights-law [https://perma.cc/U7JR-CVH4]).
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of-harm standard for withholding cases and acknowledged withholding as
a domestic adoption of Article 33 non-refoulement. 125 Three years later,
the Supreme Court revisited withholding and non-refoulement in INS v.
Cardoza-Fonseca. 126 Cardoza-Fonseca involved a much greater analysis
of withholding as the adoption of non-refoulement, the binding nature of
non-refoulement, and the INA as adherence to the 1951 Refugee
Convention and 1967 Protocol. 127
Stevic involved a Yugoslavian alien who entered the United States in
1976 to visit family and overstayed his six-week period of admission.128
After the INS initiated removal proceedings, the alien conceded
removability and sought withholding of removal. 129 The IJ denied relief,
and the BIA, relying on a pre-Refugee Act of 1980 withholding provision,
upheld the IJ’s decision. 130 The Second Circuit reversed and remanded,
requiring the BIA to use the proper standard for withholding. 131 The
Supreme Court granted certiorari to clarify the standard for withholding
under the INA. 132 The question before the Court was whether a lower
likelihood-of-harm standard for asylum cases also governs applications for
withholding. 133
The Court’s analysis began with a discussion of the United States’
accession to the 1967 Protocol, which the Court explained “bound parties
to comply with the substantive provisions of Articles 2 through 34 of the
United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees.” 134 The
Court then produced the 1951 Refugee Convention and 1967 Protocol’s
definitions of refugee, non-refoulement, and naturalization as expressed in
Articles 1, 33, and 34135 before describing those provisions as consistent
with U.S. standards and laws for refugee claims:
125. INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407 (1984).
126. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987).
127. Id. at 436–41.
128. Stevic, 467 U.S. at 409.
129. Id. at 409–10. The Respondent in Stevic initially agreed to depart
voluntarily but moved to reopen deportation proceedings and claim refugee relief
after his American wife was killed in a car accident. The Respondent’s first
petition for withholding was denied, but he reopened proceedings again after the
Refugee Act of 1980 amended the withholding provision of the INA. Id. at 409–
11.
130. Id. at 411–12.
131. Id. at 412.
132. Id. at 413.
133. Id. at 409.
134. Id. at 416.
135. Id. at 416–17.
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The President and the Senate believed that the Protocol was
largely consistent with existing law. There are many statements to
that effect in the legislative history of the accession to the
Protocol. And it was ‘“absolutely clear” that the Protocol would
not “require[e] the United States to admit new categories or
numbers of aliens.” It was also believed that apparent differences
between the Protocol and existing statutory law could be
reconciled by the Attorney General in administration and did not
require any modification of statutory language. 136
But, as the Court recalled, within five years of acceding to the 1967
Protocol, basic controversies over U.S. withholding practices and
international standards for Article 33 non-refoulement created persistent
legal challenges by alien claimants. 137 The Stevic Court explained that “the
Refugee Act of 1980 amended the language of § 243(h), basically
conforming it to the language of Article 33 of the United Nations
Protocol.”138
The Stevic decision establishes three significant principles: (1) in
ratifying the 1967 Protocol, the United States felt its provisions and
definitions—including the principle of non-refoulement—were wholly
consistent with U.S. law and practice; (2) the United States’ binding
obligation to the principle of non-refoulement necessitated the Refugee
Act of 1980’s amendment to the language of the INA to conform with
international law; and (3) U.S. law and practice frequently conflates
asylum and withholding of removal standards and analysis. 139 The first
two Stevic principles point toward the unavoidable conclusion that the
United States has a binding obligation to adhere to the principle of nonrefoulement as expressed in international law, while the third illustrates
U.S. failure to meet that obligation.
The Supreme Court’s next major refugee-law case, Cardoza-Fonseca,
involved a 38-year-old Nicaraguan respondent who entered the United
States in 1976 as a visitor and stayed past her permitted timeframe.140
Removal proceedings ensued, with the alien conceding removability and

136. Id. at 417–18 (internal citations omitted) (citing S. EXEC. REP. NO. 90-14,
at 4 (1968) (“refugees in the United States have long enjoyed the protection and
the rights which the protocol calls for”); and then citing S. EXEC. REP. NO. 90-14,
at 6, 7 (1968) (“the United States already meets the standards of the Protocol”)).
137. Id. at 418.
138. Id. at 421.
139. See id. at 417–22.
140. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 424 (1987).
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applying for asylum and withholding. 141 The IJ applied the same “more
likely than not” likelihood-of-harm standard to deny claims for both
asylum and withholding. 142 The BIA affirmed, and on review the Ninth
Circuit reversed and remanded for reconsideration of the asylum claim
because both the IJ and BIA had applied the higher likelihood-of-harm
standard for withholding to the applicant’s claim for asylum. 143 The
Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a then-existing circuit conflict
over whether the likelihood-of-harm standard for withholding claims
applied to asylum. 144
The Court again turned to international law and an analysis of the 1951
Refugee Convention and 1967 Protocol—with a particular emphasis on
the definition of “refugee,” Article 33 non-refoulement, and Article 34
naturalization—to resolve conflicts within U.S. withholding and asylum
standards. 145 Perhaps most significant to the binding nature of
international refugee law on U.S. practice is the Court’s almost-exclusive
reliance on international law and legislative history to determine proper
interpretations of the INA. 146 In determining “[t]he message conveyed by
the plain language of the [INA],” the Court considered “the abundant
evidence of an intent to conform the definition of ‘refugee’ and our asylum
[and withholding] law to the United Nation[s’] Protocol to which the
United States has been bound since 1968.” 147 Even the Court’s
examination of the legislative history surrounding the U.S. system for
processing refugee claims confirmed the binding nature of international
refugee law on U.S. law and practice:
If one thing is clear from the legislative history of the new
definition of “refugee,” and indeed the entire 1980 Act, it is that
one of Congress’ primary purposes was to bring United States
refugee law into conformance with the 1967 United Nations
Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, to which the United
States acceded in 1968. 148
To determine the proper standards for withholding, the Court looked
to “Article 33.1 of the Convention, which is the counterpart of § 243(h) of
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.

Id.
Id. at 425.
Id. at 425–26.
Id. at 426.
Id. at 432–50.
See id.
Id. at 432–33.
Id. at 436–37 (internal citations omitted).
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our statute.”149 In fact, the Cardoza-Fonseca Court describes withholding
as simply another name for non-refoulement in reference to Stevic: “In
Stevic, we dealt with the issue of withholding of deportation, or
nonrefoulement, under § 243(h). This provision corresponds to Article
33.1 of the Convention.”150 The Cardoza-Fonseca Court also
acknowledged that the right to asylum for eligible refugees was “made
binding on the United States through the Protocol, Article 34.” 151 The
Court looked to additional international-law interpretations, relying on the
U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees’ Handbook to elucidate the proper
standards for asylum and withholding claims respectively. 152 The
Cardoza-Fonseca opinion provides no room for doubt as to the binding
nature of international refugee law on domestic law and practice, including
that of non-refoulement on U.S. withholding-of-removal analysis and
dispositions. It also once again highlights the issue of U.S. conflation of
withholding and asylum analyses.
IV. MODERN WITHHOLDING AND PRIVATE PERSECUTION: UNLAWFUL
FAILURE TO ADHERE TO NON-REFOULEMENT
Parts II and III provided a base upon which to analyze this Article’s
central proposition: that modern American withholding-of-removal law
and practice violates international and domestic law. That base discussion
demonstrates the centrality of non-refoulement to the refugee-law regime,
its binding nature at international and domestic law, and withholding as
the American application of non-refoulement. Part IV discusses U.S.
failure to adhere to that binding principle.
Part IV will first examine international law’s treatment of nonrefoulement claims involving private persecution—harm inflicted by nonstate actors—finding that non-refoulement encompasses a broad
interpretation of the unwilling-and-unable standard for private-persecution
claims at international law when an alien’s home state cannot provide
effective protection. Turning to domestic treatment of non-refoulement
claims in the form of withholding dispositions, this Part analyzes data from
the Executive Office of Immigration Review Statistical Yearbooks and

149. Id. at 429 (internal citations omitted).
150. Id. at 440.
151. Id. at 441.
152. See id. at 438–39 (“In interpreting the Protocol’s definition of ‘refugee’
we are further guided by the analysis set forth in the Office of the United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees, Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for
Determining Refugee Status”).
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finds a disproportionally low rate of withholding grants both generally and
as a percentage of total refugee-claim grants.
Next, this Part analyzes Matter of A-B-, a controversial case in which
the AG raised the standard for private persecution in both asylum and
withholding claims, contrary to the established principle that the AG lacks
discretion to determine withholding criteria. Though the current AG
vacated Matter of A-B-, its impact on jurisdictions that adopted its
heightened standard as reasonable remains in effect and it is unclear
whether new agency rules for private persecution will adhere to nonrefoulement standards. Finally, this Part analyzes a dataset of all published
U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals cases from 2015–2020 in which the
unwilling-or-unable standard was dispositive in a withholding
determination. That analysis shows that: (1) asylum and withholding
analyses are almost always conflated in American law, with a generally
low rate of actual analysis dedicated to resolving withholding claims;
(2) Matter of A-B-’s misapplied and unlawful standard for withholding in
private-persecution cases has been adopted into caselaw in some U.S.
jurisdictions, persisting past its vacation; and (3) some U.S. jurisdictions
determine whether a government is unable or unwilling to protect an
applicant without considering whether that government offers effective
protection, contrary to international law. These findings demonstrate that
American withholding practice fails to adhere to the binding principle of
non-refoulement.
C. International Law, Non-refoulement, and Private Persecution
A primary and essential question in this Article’s analysis must be:
does non-refoulement apply to private persecution, and if so, what
constitutes private persecution entitling a refugee to withholding of
removal at international and U.S. law? The Travaux Préparatoires to the
1951 Refugee Convention and U.N. Handbooks clearly point to a broad
definition of non-refoulement that encompasses private conduct when a
government is unwilling or unable to effectively protect an applicant for
withholding. 153
153. Travaux Préparatoires, supra note 7, at art. 33; U.N. Handbook, supra
note 58; U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, Guidance Note on Refugee Claims
Relating to Victims of Organized Gangs, (Mar. 31, 2010), https://www
.refworld.org/docid/4bb21fa02.html [https://perma.cc/GVL5-8838] [hereinafter
UNHCR Gang Guidance]; U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, Guidelines on
International Protection: Gender-Related Persecution within the context of Article
1A(2) of the 1951 Convention and/or its 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of
Refugees, U.N. Doc. HCR/GIP/02/01 (May 7, 2002) https://www.unhcr.org/en-
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Travaux Préparatoires offer a unique look at an international
agreement. Literally translated to “preparatory activities” or “preparatory
works,” these documents are a behind-the-scenes record of the
conversations, concerns, and input of various parties over the course of
drafting a treaty. 154 The Travaux Préparatoires to the 1951 Refugee
Convention demonstrate that the states party to the Convention intended
non-refoulement under then-Article 28 of the Ad Hoc Committee’s report
to be: (1) essentially without exception, 155 (2) foundational to international
refugee law, 156 (3) extremely broad and far-reaching under the new Article
33, 157 and (4) requiring evaluation of effective protection, not just a goodfaith effort by the home state. 158 In discussions of possible exceptions to
Article 33, the United States delegation felt that no exceptions to nonrefoulement could or should exist, “even [in] highly exceptional cases.”159
Indeed, the Travaux Préparatoires demonstrate that the Executive
Committee felt non-refoulement should apply to “persons who may be
subjected to persecution if returned to their country of origin irrespective
of whether or not they have been formally recognized as refugees.”160
Notably absent from the Travaux Préparatoires Article 33 is any language
requiring state acts, though this should not surprise given that the 1951
Refugee Convention itself also does not include such language. 161
U.N. Handbooks and Guidelines are helpful aids to understanding
non-refoulement and private persecution, with three directly on point:
us/publications/legal/3d58ddef4/guidelines-international-protection-1-genderrelated-persecution-context.html [https://perma.cc/7GXB-ZH36] [hereinafter
UNHCR DV Guidance].
154. Travaux Préparatoires, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
155. See Travaux Préparatoires, supra note 7, at art. 33 (“While some question
was raised as to the possibility of exceptions to Article 28, the Committee felt
strongly that the principle here expressed was fundamental and that it should not
be impaired.”).
156. Id.
157. See id. (“The Executive Committee . . . [e]xpressed deep concern at the
information given by the High Commissioner that, while the principle of nonrefoulement is in practice widely observed, this principle has in certain cases been
disregarded; [The Executive Committee r]eaffirms the fundamental importance
of the observance of the principle of non-refoulement - both at the border and
within the territory of a State – of persons who may be subjected to persecution if
returned to their country of origin irrespective of whether or not they have been
formally recognized as refugees.”).
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id.; 1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 6, at art. 33.
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(1) the U.N. Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining
Refugee Status under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol relating
to the Status of Refugees (“U.N. Handbook”); 162 (2) the U.N. High
Commissioner for Refugees Guidance Note on Refugee Claims Relating
to Victims of Organized Gangs (“UNHCR Gang Guidance”); 163 and (3)
the U.N. Refugee Agency’s Guidelines on International Protection:
Gender-Related Persecution within the context of Article 1A(2) of the
1951 Convention and/or its 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of
Refugees (“UNHCR DV Guidance”). 164
The U.N. Handbook was born from the U.N. Executive Committee of
the High Commissioner’s Programme’s request and is meant to be a
guideline for government officials determining refugee claims. 165 The
U.N. Handbook is continually updated to address new and emerging
refugee issues. 166 It contains clear and direct guidance for determining
viable private-persecution claims:
Persecution is normally related to action by the authorities of a
country. It may also emanate from sections of the population that
do not respect the standards established by the laws of the country
concerned. A case in point may be religious intolerance,
amounting to persecution, in a country otherwise secular, but
where sizeable fractions of the population do not respect the
religious beliefs of their neighbours. Where serious discriminatory
or other offensive acts are committed by the local populace, they
can be considered as persecution if they are knowingly tolerated
by the authorities, or if the authorities refuse, or prove unable, to
offer effective protection. 167
The U.N. Handbook’s definition of private persecution entitling a
refugee to relief reveals two important principles of non-refoulement at
international law: (1) private parties who violate human rights may
commit persecution entitling their victims to relief; 168 and (2) nonrefoulement is required unless the home state offers effective protection.169
The U.N. Handbook states that “laws of the country of origin, and
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.

U.N. Handbook, supra note 58.
UNHCR Gang Guidance, supra note 153.
UNHCR DV Guidance, supra note 153.
U.N. Handbook, supra note 58, at Foreword.
Id.
Id. at ¶65.
See id.
See id.
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particularly the manner in which they are applied, will be relevant” to
claims for withholding or non-refoulement. 170
These passages from the U.N. Handbook describe a broad class of
refugees entitled to non-refoulement due to private persecution, whether
the private actor is unconstrained due to the absence of state laws
prohibiting human rights violations,171 disregards those laws, 172 or is
merely met with ineffective state intervention. 173 In no uncertain terms,
the Handbook not only recognizes a broad interpretation of private
persecution, but clearly adopts a standard requiring effective state
protection, not merely a good-faith state effort. 174
The UNHCR Gang Guidance provides guidance on how the U.N.
Handbook’s principles operate in a real-life example: refugees fleeing
violence by private gangs in nations unwilling or unable to offer effective
protection from those gangs. 175 The UNHCR Gang Guidance cites the
U.N. Handbook’s provision on private persecution, again demanding that
state protection must be effective to preclude a successful non-refoulement
claim for private persecution:
In most gang-related claims, the persecution emanates from the
criminal gangs and other similar non-State groups. As stipulated
by the UNHCR Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for
Determining Refugee Status, persecution may “emanate from
sections of the population that do not respect the standards
established by the laws of the country concerned . . . [and when]
discriminatory or other offensive acts are committed by the local
populace, they can be considered as persecution if they are
knowingly tolerated by the authorities or if the authorities refuse,
or prove unable, to offer effective protection.” After determining
whether the harm feared can be considered persecution in the
sense of the 1951 Convention, it is necessary to establish whether
the State is unwilling or unable to provide protection to victims of
gang-related violence. The authorities may be unwilling to protect
a particular individual, for instance, because of their own financial
interest in the gang activities or because they consider the person
associated with or targeted by the gangs unworthy of protection.
The State could prove unable to provide effective protection,
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.

See id. at ¶43.
See id.
See id. at ¶65.
See id.
See id. at ¶43, ¶65.
UNHCR Gang Guidance, supra note 153, at 8–9.
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especially when certain gangs, such as the Maras, yield
considerable power and capacity to evade law enforcement or
when the corruption is pervasive. . . . A State is not expected to
guarantee the highest possible standard of protection to all its
citizens all the time, but protection needs to be real and
effective. 176
The UNHCR Gang Guidance also provides examples of factors
indicating a state’s unwillingness or inability to offer effective protection:
lack of measures to ensure security to individuals at risk of harm
by gangs; a general unwillingness on the part of the public to seek
police or governmental assistance because doing so may be
perceived as futile or likely to increase risk of harm by gangs; a
prevalence of corruption, impunity and serious crimes, such as
extrajudicial killings, drugs and human trafficking, implicating
government officials, police and security forces. 177
The UNHCR DV Guidance provides a similar reference to the U.N.
Handbook’s private-persecution section to support a requirement that
governments provide effective protection against private persecution.178
The UNHCR DV Guidance leaves no doubt that persecutory genderrelated claims may be “perpetrated by State or private actors.”179 The
UNHCR DV Guidance’s acceptance of the effective-protection standard
for unwilling-and-unable claims is unwavering:
Even though a particular State may have prohibited a persecutory
practice . . . the State may nevertheless . . . not be able to stop the
practice effectively. In such cases, the practice would still amount
to persecution. The fact that a law has been enacted to prohibit or
denounce certain persecutory practices will therefore not in itself
be sufficient to determine that the individual’s claim to refugee

176. Id. at 9.
177. Id. at 9–10.
178. UNHCR DV Guidance, supra note 153, at ¶19 (“There is scope within
the refugee definition to recognise both State and non-State actors of persecution.
While persecution is most often perpetrated by the authorities of a country, serious
discriminatory or other offensive acts committed by local populace, or by
individuals, can also be considered persecution if such acts are knowingly
tolerated by the authorities, or if the authorities refuse, or are unable, to offer
effective protection.”) (citing U.N. Handbook, supra note 58, at ¶65).
179. UNHCR DV Guidance, supra note 153, at ¶ 9.
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status is not valid. 180
The UNHCR DV Guidance cites examples of states that expressly
prohibit female genital mutilation or do not criminalize homosexuality but
fail to offer effective protection from genital mutilation or homophobic
violence. 181
The U.N. Handbook and UNHCR guides are compelling, but not
dispositive, in their interpretation of private-persecution standards at U.S.
law. 182 However, when the explicit language of the U.N. Handbook and
UNHCR guides are paired with the broad, exception-free 183 mandate of
non-refoulement as expressed in the Travaux Préparatoires to the 1951
Refugee Convention—and the Convention is binding and dispositive on
U.S. law through ratification of the Protocol—it is clear that (1) the
definition of persecution must encompass private behavior when the home
state is unwilling or unable to offer protection and (2) that protection must
be effective. Where a home state is unwilling or unable to provide effective
and meaningful protection, the principle of non-refoulement entitles a
refugee to withholding of removal at international and U.S. law.
B. Agency Data on Withholding Grant Rates Generally
Having extensively discussed non-refoulement at international law,
this Article now turns to American implementation of non-refoulement
through withholding of removal. The previous analysis has shown that
withholding and non-refoulement: (1) are meant to be identical or nearly
identical to one another in significant part; 184 (2) comprise the fundamental
cornerstone of refugee law; 185 (3) are essentially without exception at
international law, by the U.S. delegation’s own admission and
180. Id. at ¶11 (emphasis removed).
181. Id. at ¶11, 17.
182. See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 438–39 (1987) (“In
interpreting the Protocol’s definition of ‘refugee’ we are further guided by the
analysis set forth in the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees, Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status
(Geneva, 1979).”); but see INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 427–28 (1999)
(“The U.N. Handbook may be a useful interpretive aid, but it is not binding on the
Attorney General, the BIA, or United States courts.”).
183
Art. 33(2) contains an exception for aliens who present national security risks
or commit particularly serious crimes. The term “exception-free” in this article
refers to the international community’s rejection of any exception outside the text
of the article itself.
184. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 440.
185. Travaux Préparatoires, supra note 7, at Introduction.
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leadership; 186 (4) are binding U.S. law through the treaty provision of the
Constitution and the implementation of the INA;187 (5) encompass claims
based on private persecution when a home government is unwilling or
unable to protect the refugee; 188 and (6) require that a home government
provide effective protection against persecution. 189 This Section addresses
the first four principles above, examining whether American jurisprudence
has treated withholding generally as a foundational and near-absolute form
of relief reflective of its status as the binding domestic version of nonrefoulement. The rest of this Article will examine the final two principles
to determine whether the United States has failed to fulfill its obligation to
uphold non-refoulement.
To examine general withholding-of-removal trends in the United
States, this Section turns to the Department of Justice’s Executive Office
of Immigration Review (“EOIR”) agency data. Each Fiscal Year (“FY”)
from 2000 through 2018, the EOIR kept a Statistics Yearbook
encompassing statistics and trends for that year and over the preceding
four-year period. 190 Because each Statistics Yearbook reports data for the
four years prior to its publishing, the agency data includes 22 years’ worth
of trends on asylum and withholding of removal dispositions, among other
agency statistics.191 However, the Fiscal Yearbooks did not track
withholding, except as a subset of Convention Against Torture relief, until
FY05, giving withholding data only from FY01–FY18. 192 This is perhaps
the first indicator that American law and practice conflates withholding
and other forms of refugee relief, neglecting withholding analysis and
failing to recognize the binding nature of non-refoulement.
The EOIR Statistics Yearbooks portray withholding as a seldomimplemented form of relief at American law. Withholding is granted at a
fraction of the rate at which asylum is granted. Grant rate alone does not
explain why withholding is so rarely granted, nor does it explicitly show
that American courts and administrative agencies are applying improper
186. Id. at art. 33.
187. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.; Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94
Stat. 102; Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat.
163.
188. See, e.g., Grace v. Barr, 965 F.3d 883, 889 (D.C. Cir. 2020).
189. U.N. Handbook, supra note 58, at ¶55.
190. See, e.g., Stat. Y.B. Fiscal Year 2018, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. EXEC. OFF. FOR
IMMIGR. REV., 26–27 (2019) [hereinafter FY18 Yearbook].
191. Compare FY18 Yearbook, supra note 190, at 26–27, with FY 2005 Stat.
Y.B., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. EXEC. OFF. FOR IMMIGR. REV., K2, K5 (2005)
[hereinafter FY05 Yearbook].
192. See FY05 Yearbook, supra note 191, at K5.
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standards or insufficient analyses to withholding claims. However, it
clearly shows that whatever analysis American courts do use tends to
result in a denial of withholding of removal at a disproportionately high
rate to that of asylum. This Section contains charts and graphs displaying
the data discussed. Figure 1 is a graph depicting asylum grant rates and
asylum grants from FY01–FY18, while Figure 2 shows the same data for
withholding. A chart displaying the raw data from the EOIR Statistic
Yearbooks is displayed in Figure 3.
From FY01–FY18 the average annual grant rate for claims of
withholding of removal in the United States was 12.249%. 193 Meanwhile,
the average grant rate for asylum claims in that same timespan was
43.303%. 194 Because the analysis in Section D of this Part will focus on
caselaw from 2015 to 2020, an examination of grant rates generally from
2015 on, in this case from FY14 (2015) to FY18 (2019), is appropriate.
During this period, refugee claims were less successful generally, but the
decline in granted refugee claims was more pronounced for withholding
than asylum. 195 The average withholding rate from FY14–FY18 drops to
9.025%, which is 26% lower than the average withholding rate from
FY01–FY18. By contrast, average asylum grant rates from FY14–FY18
decreased by less than 5% as compared to the total average asylum grant
rate from FY01–FY18, retaining a substantially similar 42.189%
average. 196 Both withholding and asylum grant rates dropped significantly
within the FY14–FY18 time period as well, but the drop in grant rate was
more substantial for withholding claims: withholding grant rates decreased
53% in that five-year span, 197 while asylum grant rates only decreased by
32%. 198
From as early as FY01, withholding has been granted at a rate
fractional to that of asylum. The author has calculated a value, w/a, which
represents the withholding grant rates as a ratio of asylum grant rates for a
given year. From FY01–FY15, w/a was relatively constant at an average

193. Id.; FY 2010 Stat. Y.B., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. EXEC. OFF. FOR IMMIGR.
REV., K5 (2011) [hereinafter FY10 Yearbook]; FY 2014 Stat. Y.B., U.S. DEP’T OF
JUST. EXEC. OFF. FOR IMMIGR. REV., K5 (2015) [hereinafter FY14 Yearbook];
FY18 Yearbook, supra note 190, at 27.
194. FY05 Yearbook, supra note 191, at K5.
195. FY14 Yearbook, supra note 193, at K1, K5; FY18 Yearbook, supra note
190, at 26–27.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id.
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of 29.513. 199 That is to say that on average, withholding was granted less
than one-third as often as asylum over the past 20 years. To demonstrate
the level of consistency over that period, FY01 had a w/a of 29.469, 200 no
year in that timeframe has a w/a above 35.119, 201 and only FY15 had a
w/a as low as 23.363. 202
But in FY16–FY18 there was a marked drop in withholding grant rate,
asylum grant rate, and w/a. Withholding grant rates decreased from 11%
in FY15 to 8.030% in FY16, 7.000% in FY17, and 6.094% in FY18.203
Asylum rates also decreased, from 48.000% in FY15 to 42.776% in FY16,
38.000% in FY17, and 33.172% in FY18. 204 These numbers seem small at
first, but with context they are significant: the average grant rate for
withholding in FY16–18 was almost half the average rate in the preceding
16 years; 205 the asylum grant rate in FY16–18 was 14% less than the
average rate in the 16 years prior.206 That withholding grant rates were
disproportionately affected by the drop in FY16–18 is reflected in w/a,
which decreases to less than half its average value in the preceding years:
the average w/a for FY16–FY18 was only 18.290, compared to the prior
average of 29.880% for FY01–FY15. 207 The drop in w/a at this time means
that not only were refugee claims generally being granted less frequently
after FY16, but withholding grant rates were disproportionately impacted.
This data paints a picture of withholding as infrequently and
decreasingly granted, both generally and in proportion to asylum grant
rates. Though this data alone does not provide an explanation for both the
low rate of withholding grants and the discrepancy between withholding
and asylum grant rates, it does show withholding’s place in American
199. FY05 Yearbook, supra note 191, at K1, K5; FY10 Yearbook, supra note
193, at K1, K5; FY14 Yearbook, supra note 193, at K1, K5; FY18 Yearbook,
supra note 190, at 26–27.
200. FY05 Yearbook, supra note 191, at K1, K5.
201. Id.; FY10 Yearbook, supra note 193, at K1, K5; FY14 Yearbook, supra
note 193, at K1, K5; FY18 Yearbook, supra note 190, at 26–27.
202. FY18 Yearbook, supra note 190, at 26–27.
203. Id. at 27.
204. Id. at 26.
205. Compare FY18 Yearbook, supra note 190, at 27, with FY14 Yearbook,
supra note 193, at K5, FY10 Yearbook, supra note 193, at K5, and FY05
Yearbook, supra note 191, at K5.
206. Compare FY18 Yearbook, supra note 190, at 26, with FY14 Yearbook,
supra note 193, at K1, FY10 Yearbook, supra note 193, at K1, and FY05
Yearbook, supra note 191, at K1.
207. Compare FY18 Yearbook, supra note 190, at 26–27, with FY14
Yearbook, supra note 193, at K1, K5, FY10 Yearbook, supra note 193, at K1, K5,
and FY05 Yearbook, supra note 191, at K1, K5.
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jurisprudence. That withholding is rarely granted, decreasingly granted,
and granted at a disproportionately lower rate than asylum does not reflect
the broad definition of non-refoulement, its binding impact on U.S. law,
and its foundational relationship to refugee law.

Figure 1. Asylum Grants and Grant Rates from FY01–18

Figure 2. Withholding Grants and Grant Rates from FY01–18
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Figure 3. EOIR Statistic Yearbooks Raw Data

The author predicts the following criticism of this Section’s analysis:
because asylum has a lower requirement for likelihood of harm, is it not
possible that the low and decreasing rate of withholding grants is due to
refugees being granted asylum at an increasing rate? After all, if applicants
are able to demonstrate a well-founded fear of persecution, but not a
likelihood of persecution—two standards that the Supreme Court has
found are different 208—the claimant would be granted asylum and denied
withholding. If more applications are being granted based on meeting the
likelihood-of-harm standard for asylum, but not withholding, then low
rates of withholding, and even w/a values showing disproportionately low
withholding grant rates, could be reasonable.
This proposition fails for two reasons, one data-driven and the other
based on legal principles. First, asylum rates have declined alongside both
withholding grant rates and w/a. 209 The data does not support an increase
in asylum grant rates to compensate for the disparity in withholding grant
rates: grant rates for both asylum and withholding declined from FY16–
18, with asylum grant rate decreasing by 22.452% and withholding grant
rate decreasing by 24.120%. 210 The data does not support a conclusion that
208. See, e.g., INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 423–24 (1987).
209. Compare FY18 Yearbook, supra note 190, at 26, with FY14 Yearbook,
supra note 193, at K1, FY10 Yearbook, supra note 193, at K1, and FY05
Yearbook, supra note 191, at K1.
210. Compare FY18 Yearbook, supra note 190, at 26–27, with FY14
Yearbook, supra note 193, at K1, K5, FY10 Yearbook, supra note 193, at K1, K5,
and FY05 Yearbook, supra note 191, at K1, K5.
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the decrease in withholding grant rate is due to more applicants succeeding
on asylum claims based on the lower likelihood-of-harm standard. Next,
U.S. caselaw does not require IJs, the BIA, or circuit courts to consider
claims that are not necessary to granting or denying relief.211 If an
applicant meets the criteria for asylum, but would not meet the criteria for
withholding because of its higher likelihood-of-harm standard, the
disposition authority would not reach the issue of withholding, as it would
no longer be necessary for disposition. 212 Because withholding rates were
calculated using grants as a percentage of grants and denials only, they do
not include cases in which withholding was not reached. Therefore, the
withholding grant rate figures above do not include cases in which asylum
was granted based on the likelihood-of-harm standard and withholding
was denied on the same grounds.
This data shows that withholding is granted at both a low rate and a
disproportionately lower rate than asylum in American law and practice.
Withholding-grant-rate data suggests, but does not definitively
demonstrate, that withholding practice does not meet the foundational,
broad-reaching mandate of non-refoulement. The sharp decrease in
withholding grant rates, both generally and as a percentage of asylum rates
(w/a) at FY17 does, however, correlate to an increase in standards for
asylum in the AG’s 2018 decision Matter of A-B-. 213 It bears remembering
that Matter of A-B- temporally coincides with a marked decrease in
withholding grant rates, both generally and as a fraction of asylum rates.
Though the Fiscal Yearbook data does not and cannot explain exactly why
withholding grant rates fall disproportionately in FY17, the following
Sections posit that misapplication of heightened asylum standards to
withholding claims at that time could logically be a significant
contributing factor.
C. Matter of A-B- and Attorney General Discretion
Having established that withholding is granted at a lower rate than
would be expected in order to uphold the principle of non-refoulement, the
next question may be: why? Why does American law and practice apply a
foundational concept of refugee law with such irregularity and
infrequency? Is this a coincidental correlation? Or can we track a specific
practice or legal principle to explain the break from international law? This
Article’s general argument is that American law and practice does not
211. INS v. Bagamasbad, 429 U.S. 24 (1976) (per curiam).
212. See, e.g., Prieto-Pineda v. Barr, 960 F.3d 516, 522 (8th Cir. 2020) (finding
BIA did not need to rule on matters unnecessary to its final disposition).
213. Matter of A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316 (2018).
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comply with the binding principle of non-refoulement. There could be
other points of divergence from which American law fails to adhere to
binding international and domestic refugee law principles, but this
Article’s discrete vantage point is the misapplication of AG discretion to
withholding in private-persecution claims, which has been adopted by
some U.S. circuit courts. That misapplication is most significantly
embodied in the now-vacated, but still impactful 2018 AG decision Matter
of A-B-. 214
The AG has the authority to review and dispose of BIA cases. 215 This
review authority permits the AG to proclaim standards and issue opinions
deciding issues of immigration and refugee law. 216 Cases are referred to
the AG either at the request of the AG him or herself, by the BIA, or by
the Secretary of Homeland Security. 217 There is no discernable standard,
limitation, or uniform procedure for the types of cases or issues the AG
may refer to him or herself. 218 There is no comment or review period
before enacting unilateral AG-mandated rulings. 219 The authority, though
controversial, is rarely invoked. 220 AGs have used referral authority
sparingly to settle disputed issues of law or policy and referred cases have
tended historically to result in negative dispositions for refugee
applicants. 221 This authority has been invoked more frequently after 2016
than ever before. 222
On March 7, 2018, the AG directed the BIA to refer Matter of A-B-, a
case in which the BIA had granted asylum. 223 The AG self-referred the
case to determine “whether, and under what circumstances, being a victim
of private criminal activity constitutes a cognizable ‘particular social
group’ for purposes of an application for asylum or withholding of
removal.” 224 Though Matter of A-B- was referred for disposition on this
issue, the opinion also goes on to establish new standards for private
214. See id. at 337 (announcing new standard for private persecution contrary
to international law).
215. 8 C.F.R. §1003.1(h)(1)(i) (2021).
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Holliday, supra note 35.
219. Id. at 2158–59.
220. Id. at 2159.
221. Id. at 2159–60.
222. See id. at 2161 (“Comparatively, Attorneys General under the Trump
Administration have already used the referral authority more frequently than
previous administrations, invoking it four times in 2018 alone.”).
223. Matter of A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316 (A.G. 2018).
224. Id. at 317.
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persecution generally, including redefining the unwilling-or-unable
standard. 225
Matter of A-B- contains only a one-sentence factual background: “The
respondent asserted that her ex-husband, with whom she shares three
children, repeatedly abused her physically, emotionally, and sexually
during and after their marriage.” 226 In reality the respondent, Ms. A-B-,
was married to a serial abuser and monster by any standard: he raped and
beat her consistently for 15 years, threatened to kill her with a loaded gun,
and threatened to hang her while she was pregnant with his child. 227 Ms.
A-B- could not secure effective protection from police because her
husband’s brother was a local police officer. 228 The local El Salvadoran
court issued two protective orders against Ms. A-B-’s husband, but the
police refused to enforce the orders and made Ms. A-B- personally serve
them on her husband, exposing her to risk of further abuse and
undermining the façade of protection. 229 When Ms. A-B- moved two hours
away, her abuser found her. 230 After divorcing her husband, Ms. A-B- was
confronted by his brother, the police officer, who threatened to kill her.231
Despite these circumstances, the AG vacated the BIA’s grant of relief
and denied withholding and asylum to Ms. A-B-. 232 In doing so, the
opinion codified a heightened standard for the third prong of persecution,
government involvement:
An applicant seeking to establish persecution based on violent
conduct of a private actor “must show more than ‘difficulty . . .
controlling’ private behavior.” The applicant must show that the
government condoned the private actions “or at least
demonstrated a complete helplessness to protect the victims.”233
Of note, the AG in Matter of A-B- levied this heightened standard for
persecution to both asylum and withholding claims, since the standard was
expressly and intentionally applied to a claim for both in the case. 234
225. Id. at 337.
226. Id. at 321; see also Vogel, supra note 46, at 379 (“In his decision, the
Attorney General referenced the facts asserted by Ms. A-B- in one sentence”).
227. Vogel, supra note 46, at 379.
228. Id. at 379–80.
229. Id. at 380.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Matter of A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316, 346 (2018).
233. Id. at 337 (internal citations omitted).
234. See id. at 317 (“Specifically, I sought briefing on whether, and under what
circumstances, being a victim of private criminal activity constitutes a cognizable
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Whatever a condones-or-complete-helplessness standard entails, it is
clearly higher than a standard requiring that protection be effective: 235 a
government, like in Matter of A-B-, may be unable to offer effective
protection but, through either a good-faith but ineffective effort or only
near-complete helplessness, might be considered willing and able to
protect a refugee claimant. In such cases, the standard of persecution for
withholding of removal in private-persecution claims is higher than nonrefoulement, though these forms of relief are meant to mirror one
another. 236
On June 16, 2021, the current AG exercised his discretion to certify
Matter of A-B- to himself and vacate the 2016 decision. 237 The new AG
decision cites confusion among U.S. courts in applying the standards laid
out in Matter of A-B- and the need for promulgation of unified agency
regulations for private persecution claims. 238 Matter of A-B-’s vacation is
a step toward aligning withholding practice with the requirements of nonrefoulement, but serious concerns about American practice remain
unaddressed.
The decision vacating Matter of A-B- does not mention nonrefoulement, the 1967 Protocol, Article 33, or international refugee law at
all. 239 That the current AG recognizes the impropriety of Matter of A-B-’s
standard corrects in part the latest deviance from non-refoulement
standards, but it is unclear whether non-refoulement will be considered in
the new agency rules or any further BIA or AG decisions defining private
persecution standards.
Matter of A-B-’s impact on circuit canon is still palpable despite its
vacation. Circuit courts that have adopted Matter of A-B-’s private
persecution standard as reasonable are still bound by precedent to adhere
‘particular social group’ for purposes of an application for asylum or withholding
of removal.”); see also id. at 320 (“While I do not decide that violence inflicted
by non-governmental actors may never serve as the basis for an asylum or
withholding application . . . in practice such claims are unlikely to satisfy the
statutory grounds for proving group persecution that the government is unable or
unwilling to address.”).
235. See, e.g., Grace v. Barr, 965 F.3d 833, 898–99 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (“A
government that ‘condones’ or is ‘completely helpless’ in the face of persecution
is obviously more culpable, or more incompetent, than one that is simply
‘unwilling or unable’ to protect its citizens.”).
236. Compare id., with INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 440 (1987)
(stating that withholding is meant to embody non-refoulement) (emphasis added).
237. Matter of A-B-, Respondent, 28 I. & N. Dec. 307, 308–09 (2021).
238. Id.
239. Id. at 307–09.
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to that standard for private persecution claims. 240 Even post-Matter of AB-, those courts can and do continue to apply the heightened standard as a
matter of precedent and circuit canon. 241 Of equal, continued concern are
lines of circuit precedent that adopted a heightened standard for private
persecution claims entirely independently of Matter of A-B. 242 For both of
these types of cases, Matter of A-B-’s vacation does not mitigate its impact
on the law. Circuit caselaw both adopting Matter of A-B-’s standard as
reasonable and establishing heightened standards for private persecution
are discussed in greater detail Section D.
As discussed in this Section, this exercise of AG discretion in
unilaterally assigning standards to refugee claims may be appropriate in
asylum cases, but it is not appropriate in resolving withholding claims.243
240. Compare Scarlett v. Barr, 957 F.3d 316, 331–34 (2d Cir. 2020) (adopting
Matter of A-B-), with Ramirez-De Requeno v. Garland, No. 19-3201, 2022 U.S.
App. LEXIS 4083, at *4 (Feb. 15, 2022) (continuing to adhere to the Matter of AB- heightened standard and citing Scarlett v. Barr as precedent for its continued
application in the Second Circuit even after Matter of A-B-’s vacation).
241. Compare Scarlett, 957 F.3d at 331–34, with Ramirez-De Requeno, 2022
U.S. App. LEXIS 4083, at *4.
242. See, e.g., Olmos-Colaj v. Sessions, 886 F.3d 168, 176 (1st Cir. 2018);
Saldana v. Lynch, 820 F.3d 970, 977 (8th Cir. 2016); Galina v. INS, 213 F.3d
955, 958 (7th Cir. 2000).
243. See, e.g., INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 420 (1999) (“[W]hereas
withholding is mandatory unless the Attorney General determines one of the
exceptions applies, the decision whether asylum should be granted to an eligible
alien is committed to the Attorney General’s discretion.”); but see id. at 424–25
(“It is clear that principles of Chevron deference are applicable to this statutory
scheme. The INA provides that ‘[t]he Attorney General shall be charged with the
administration and enforcement’ of the statute and that the ‘determination and
ruling by the Attorney General with respect to all questions of law shall be
controlling.’ Section 1253(h), moreover, in express terms confers decisionmaking
authority on the Attorney General, making an alien’s entitlement to withholding
turn on the Attorney General’s ‘determin[ation’] whether the statutory conditions
for withholding have been met.”) (internal citation omitted).
That Chevron deference applies to the INA does not excuse the United
States from complying with its constitutional requirement to adhere to nonrefoulement treaty obligations. While some decision-making authority rests with
the Attorney General to determine whether “statutory standards” for withholding
are met in a particular case, Chevron does not give the Attorney General authority
to determine what those “statutory standards” are, particularly where legislative
intent is clear in regard to withholding of removal standards. The clear legislative
intent of the INA, as explicitly acknowledged by the Supreme Court in Stevic and
Cardoza-Fonseca to comply with the 1951 Refugee Convention and 1967
Protocol leave no room for ambiguity in determining or administering
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While the AG has authority to self-refer cases involving applications for
withholding, his or her authority is only to resolve those cases according
to statutory standards, 244 not to develop higher standards for private
persecution. Because asylum is granted at the AG’s discretion, 245 it is only
logical that the AG can raise standards for asylum grants: doing so is
essentially stating in my discretion, I will not grant any asylum claim that
does not reach this new standard. The same cannot be said for withholding
because the AG must grant withholding to a meritorious applicant, whose
merit is determined by statutory criteria, 246 a principle established by
international law, 247 U.S. treaty and constitutional obligations, 248 and
Supreme Court precedent. 249 The AG’s declaration of a higher unwillingor-unable standard for withholding applicants in Matter of A-B- was an
inappropriate overextension of authority to an area in which the AG does
not have discretion. That overextension violated international and
domestic principles of non-refoulement and the statutory purpose and
mechanics of the INA. 250
The decision vacating Matter of A-B- does not address the AG’s lack
of authority to unilaterally raise withholding standards. 251 Not once does
the decision vacating Matter of A-B- differentiate between AG discretion
in asylum cases and a lack of discretion in withholding claims. 252 Vacating
Matter of A-B- is a positive and major step in reevaluating U.S. refugee
practice, but it provides no indication that the misapplication of AG
discretion to withholding claims will be recognized or addressed without
further development in U.S. refugee law and practice.

withholding standards for private persecution, precluding the Attorney General
from changing standards for withholding under the guise of Chevron.
244. See id. at 424–25.
245. See id. at 420; 8 U.S.C.§ 1158.
246. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3); INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 444
(1987).
247. See, e.g., 1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 6, at 176; Travaux
Préparatoires, supra note 7, at art. 33; U.N. Handbook, supra note 58, at 65.
248. 1967 Protocol, supra note 6; U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
249. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. at 420; Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 444.
250. See INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 421 (1984) (describing INA as amended
by Refugee Act of 1980 as coming into compliance with Art. 33).
251. See id.
252. See id.
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D. Circuit Caselaw Analysis of Withholding in Cases of Private
Persecution
Having established the binding nature of non-refoulement and
withholding, their broad applicability to private-persecution claims, and
the heightened withholding standard from the now-vacated Matter of A-Bdecision, this Article next analyzes how that standard has been
incorporated into U.S. law and policy through U.S. Circuit Courts of
Appeals decisions. The caselaw shows that American courts conflate
asylum and withholding, with analysis generally dedicated to the asylum
claim while the withholding claim is frequently dismissed in a single
sentence with no original analysis. While some circuits have rejected the
Matter of A-B- standard as unlawful, others have adopted it as reasonable
and solidified its place as circuit precedent. In the most troubling cases,
there is a combination of heightened standards and no consideration for
withholding: the Matter of A-B- standard is applied to an asylum claim and
the withholding claim is dismissed in one sentence because the applicant
was not granted asylum. The result is that the circuit court intentionally or
unintentionally applies an unlawful standard to withholding claims by
failing to engage in a separate withholding analysis.
1. Data Criteria
The circuit caselaw dataset was selected by relevance, date, and
impact on the law. The first and most important criterion for selection was
that a case’s withholding disposition must in significant part turn on
private persecution and the unwilling-or-unable standard. 253 The dataset
253. The author pulled every case from the selected time period that included
the phrase “unwilling” or “unable” within one sentence of “protect” or “control.”
This produced hundreds of cases. The author then refined to 43 cases involving a
claim for withholding of removal. Finally, the author reduced those cases to those
in which the unwilling-or-unable analysis materially impacted the court’s
disposition. The result was 30 cases: Bringas-Rodriguez v. Sessions, 850 F.3d
1051 (9th Cir. 2017) (en banc); Grace v. Barr, 965 F.3d 833 (D.C. Cir. 2020);
Hernandez-Chacon v. Barr, 948 F.3d 94 (2d Cir. 2020); Doe v. Att’y Gen. of the
U.S., 956 F.3d 135 (3d Cir. 2020); Scarlett v. Barr, 957 F.3d 316 (2d Cir. 2020);
Prieto-Pineda v. Barr, 960 F.3d 516 (8th Cir. 2020); Galloso v. Barr, 954 F.3d
1189, 1193 (8th Cir. 2020); Antonio v. Barr, 959 F.3d 778 (6th Cir. 2020);
Gonzales-Veliz v. Barr, 938 F.3d 219 (5th Cir. 2019); Juarez-Coronado v. Barr,
919 F.3d 1085, 1089 (8th Cir. 2019); Martin Martin v. Barr, 916 F.3d 1141 (8th
Cir. 2019); Orellana v. Barr, 925 F.3d 145 (4th Cir. 2019); K.H. v. Barr, 920 F.3d
470 (6th Cir. 2019); C.J.L.G. v. Sessions, 880 F.3d 1122 (9th Cir. 2018); Sama v.
Att’y Gen. of the U.S., 887 F.3d 1225 (11th Cir. 2018); Tilija v. Att’y Gen. of the

2022] NON-REFOULEMENT, WITHHOLDING, AND PRIVATE PERSECUTION 777

only includes cases in which the court analyzed whether a government was
unable or unwilling to protect a withholding applicant from private
persecution and that determination played a significant part in the grant or
denial of withholding of removal. The cases selected span from January 1,
2015, to December 31, 2020. 254 Only published U.S. Courts of Appeals
cases were considered. The results include cases from each U.S. circuit
court. Many involve claims for withholding due to gang violence or
domestic abuse. 255 While some courts devote calculated analysis to
withholding claims in these circumstances, others troublingly dismiss
withholding claims in one sentence without analysis. While some reject
the heightened Matter of A-B- standard, others expressly adopt it.
2. Results
An examination of caselaw from each U.S. circuit makes four
principles clear: (1) courts conflate asylum and withholding and frequently
dismiss withholding claims with little or no analysis; (2) there is little
uniformity among circuit dispositions on private-persecution standards,
with some adopting a heightened standard while others adhere to the
effective-protection standard; (3) few circuits have confronted the Matter
of A-B- standard, and there is little unity among those who have; and (4)
circuit decisions, unlike those of the Supreme Court, tend not to reference
non-refoulement and the international foundations of U.S. refugee law.
Of the 30 cases in the dataset, nearly half dispose of an entire
withholding claim in one sentence or less with no individual analysis.256
U.S., 930 F.3d 165 (3d Cir. 2018); Olmos-Colaj v. Sessions, 886 F.3d 168 (1st
Cir. 2018); Villalta-Martinez v. Sessions, 882 F.3d 20 (1st Cir. 2018); Justo v.
Sessions, 895 F.3d 154 (1st Cir. 2018); Edionseri v. Sessions, 860 F.3d 1101 (8th
Cir. 2017); Morales-Morales v. Sessions, 857 F.3d 130 (1st Cir. 2017); Silais v.
Sessions, 855 F.3d 736 (7th Cir. 2017); Zavaleta-Policiano v. Sessions, 873 F.3d
241 (4th Cir. 2017); Kamar v. Sessions, 875 F.3d 811 (6th Cir. 2017); MendozaOrdonez v. Att’y Gen. of the U.S., 869 F.3d 164 (3d Cir. 2017); Cinto-Velasquez
v. Lynch, 817 F.3d 602 (8th Cir. 2016); Saldana v. Lynch, 820 F.3d 970 (8th Cir.
2016); Vega-Ayala v. Lynch, 833 F.3d 34 (1st Cir. 2016); Hernandez-Avalos v.
Lynch, 784 F.3d 944 (4th Cir. 2015); Pan v. Holder, 777 F.3d 540 (2d Cir. 2015);
Ritonga v. Holder, 633 F.3d 971 (10th Cir. 2011).
254. In the five-year timespan from January 1, 2015, to December 31, 2020,
there were no relevant cases from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.
To encompass Tenth Circuit precedent, the author generated another search from
January 1, 2010, to December 31, 2020, to capture relevant Tenth Circuit posture.
255. See Ad Hoc Committee, supra note 5.
256. See Galloso, 954 F.3d at 1193 (denied because asylum denied);
Gonzales-Veliz, 938 F.3d at 224 (denied because asylum denied); Juarez-
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Some that address withholding in greater detail note that the IJ or BIA
dismissed a withholding claim in one sentence without analysis because
asylum was denied; none find error in this cursory analysis. 257 A typical
one-sentence withholding dismissal is as follows: “And because [the
applicant] cannot satisfy the lower burden of proof required to establish
eligibility for asylum, it follows that she cannot establish eligibility for
withholding of removal.”258 Because withholding requires that persecution
is “likely” whereas asylum only requires a “well-founded fear” of
persecution, the standard for likelihood of harm in withholding cases is
more difficult to meet.259 It follows that a withholding claim can be
dismissed without separate analysis in those cases where a particular harm
qualifying or failing to qualify as persecution both for purposes of asylum
and withholding does not meet the well-founded-fear likelihood standard.
Such a claim would automatically fail to meet the “likely” standard for
withholding.
But likelihood of harm is just one of three criteria for determining
persecution. The AG has exercised arguably lawful discretion to raise
standards for government involvement, another criterion for persecution,
in asylum applications involving private persecution. As discussed in the
previous Section, that discretion does not extend to withholding claims.
Because the higher unwilling-or-unable standard from Matter of A-B-,
prior to its vacation, was lawfully applied to asylum but not withholding,
opinions denying asylum due to an applicant’s failure to meet that standard
for government involvement should not automatically deny a withholding
claim without separate analysis. Yet federal courts do in fact dismiss
withholding claims based on a one-sentence withholding disposition
bootstrapped to an asylum claim involving application of a heightened

Coronado, 919 F.3d at 1089 (denied because asylum denied); Martin Martin, 916
F.3d at 1145 (denied because asylum denied); C.J.L.G., 880 F.3d at 1151 (denied
because asylum denied); Sama, 887 F.3d at 1232 (denied because asylum denied);
Edionseri, 860 F.3d at 1105 (denied because asylum denied); Morales-Morales,
857 F.3d at 136 (denied because asylum denied); Cinto-Velasquez, 817 F.3d at
607 n.1 (waived); Saldana, 820 F.3d at 978 (denied because asylum denied);
Vega-Ayala, 833 F.3d at 40 (denied because asylum denied); Hernandez-Avalos,
784 F.3d at 953 n.11 (denied because asylum denied); Pan, 777 F.3d at 545
(describing withholding denial as “derivative” of asylum); Ritonga, 633 F.3d at
978 (denied because asylum denied).
257. See, e.g., Antonio, 959 F.3d at 798 (noting that BIA denied because
asylum denied without finding error in failure to separately analyze withholding).
258. Galloso, 954 F.3d at 1193 (citation omitted).
259. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 432 (1987).
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asylum standard for private persecution. Take the following hypothetical
example:
An alien is apprehended inside of the United States after illegally
entering the country. She is fleeing Honduras, where she believes her life
was threatened because of her abusive husband. She concedes
removability and applies for asylum and withholding. The IJ determines
that the feared harm does not constitute persecution because the
government of Honduras is not unwilling or unable to protect the alien
from the threatened harm. The BIA affirms, and the case is reviewed by
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. In this scenario, the Fifth
Circuit applies the condones-or-complete-helplessness standard from
Matter of A-B-, which has been adopted as circuit precedent. The court
upholds the denial of asylum because the Honduran government did not
condone or was not completely helpless to protect the alien, though
perhaps they were unable or unwilling to offer effective protection. The
court then denies the withholding claim because the alien failed to meet
the burden for asylum and withholding requires meeting a higher standard
for likelihood of harm.
What is wrong with that scenario? To begin with, there is not a higher
standard for the criterion of government involvement in withholding cases,
so any asylum disposition based on government involvement cannot
logically preclude withholding eligibility, unless the standards are
identical. But as discussed throughout this Article, they are not:
withholding is the codification of non-refoulement, which requires that
governments provide effective protection against private persecution, not
merely a lack of helplessness or condonation. When an asylum claim is
denied because the court applies the Matter of A-B- condones-orcomplete-helplessness standard, the court must apply a separate unwillingor-unable standard examining effective protection to the withholding
claim in order to comply with international refugee law, constitutional
treaty obligations, and the purpose of the INA. By denying asylum based
on a failure to meet a heightened standard for government involvement
and denying withholding without further analysis based solely on the
denial of asylum, the court in this scenario fails to adhere to the binding
principle of non-refoulement.
What else is wrong with that scenario? It is real. In Gonzales-Veliz,
the Fifth Circuit reviewed an application for asylum and withholding from
a Honduran alien fleeing domestic violence. 260 The court applied the
Matter of A-B- standard that “[t]he applicant must show that the
government condoned the private actions ‘or at least demonstrated
260. Gonzales-Veliz, 938 F.3d at 223–24.
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complete helplessness to protect the victims’” and denied the applicant’s
asylum claim. 261 The Gonzales-Veliz court summarily denied the
withholding-of-removal claim based on the Matter of A-B- asylum
standard, stating, “If an applicant does not carry his burden for asylum, he
will not qualify for withholding of removal.” 262 The Fifth Circuit’s denial
of withholding—based on an unlawful application of the Matter of A-Bstandard without engaging in a separate withholding analysis—violates
the principle of non-refoulement.
The Fifth Circuit is not alone in misapplying Matter of A-B- to dismiss
withholding claims. The Second Circuit applied Matter of A-B-’s
condones-or-complete-helplessness standard to withholding in its 2020
Scarlett v. Barr decision. 263 Scarlett involved a Jamaican former police
officer who outstayed his B-2 non-immigrant visa. 264 The alien in the case
conceded removability and applied for asylum, withholding, and CAT
relief based on threats he received from corrupt police officers with whom
he had worked in Jamaica. 265 The Scarlett court engaged in an in-depth
recapitulation of the Matter of A-B- standard before accepting it into
Second Circuit canon. 266 Unlike the Fifth Circuit in Gonzales-Veliz and
other cases with one-sentence derivative withholding denials, the Scarlett
court engaged in an extensive withholding analysis. 267 But this analysis
misapplied Matter of A-B-’s condones-or-complete-helplessness standard
to withholding rather than asking whether the Jamaican government could
offer effective protection, as is required to uphold non-refoulement and
lawfully administer withholding at international and domestic law. 268 Both
the Second and Fifth circuits continue to adhere to the Matter of A-Bstandard as precedent despite its vacation.269
Three other circuit courts have adopted or referenced the condonesor-complete-helplessness standard, even before Matter of A-B-, by

261. Id. at 231 (quoting Matter of A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316, 337 (2018)); see
also id. at 234–35 (discussing and approving the Matter of A-B- standard).
262. Id., 938 F.3d at 224 (quoting Ghotra v. Whitaker, 912 F.3d 284, 288 (5th
Cir. 2019)).
263. Scarlett v. Barr, 957 F.3d 316, 331–34 (2d Cir. 2020).
264. Id. at 321.
265. Id. at 322.
266. Id. at 331–34.
267. See id.
268. See id.
269. See, e.g., Ramirez-De Requeno v. Garland, 2022 U.S. App. LEXIS 4083,
at *4 (Feb. 15, 2022); Perez-Ramirez v. Garland, 2022 U.S. App. LEXIS 262, at
*2 (Jan. 5, 2022).
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adopting BIA rulings applying that standard. 270 It is appropriate to begin
with the Seventh Circuit, whose now-21-year-old opinion in Galina v. INS
is cited by Matter of A-B- for its heightened standard. 271 Galina involved
a Russian-Jewish immigrant who suffered ethnicity-based persecution in
her native Latvia, conceded removability, and sought asylum in the United
States. 272 Galina did not involve a claim for withholding of removal.273
Matter of A-B- cited Galina for the proposition that an “applicant must
show that the government condoned the private actions ‘or at least
demonstrated a complete helplessness to protect the victims.’”274 Matter
of A-B- quoted Galina out of context. The Galina court actually said: “a
finding of persecution ordinarily requires a determination that government
authorities, if they did not actually perpetrate or incite the persecution,
condoned it or at least demonstrated a complete helplessness to protect the
victims.” 275 Moreover, Galina was a case in which the Seventh Circuit
reversed the BIA’s denial of asylum and chastised the BIA for denying
meritorious claims based on a “woefully inaccurate” understanding of
refugee law. 276 In examining the government-involvement criterion for
persecution, the full quote from which Matter of A-B- pulled select words
is as follows:
The fact that the police had responded to Mr. Galin[a]’s call in
1993 or 1994 might be a reason to find that his wife had not been
a victim of persecution after all, since a finding of persecution
ordinarily requires a determination that government authorities, if
they did not actually perpetrate or incite the persecution, condoned
it or at least demonstrated a complete helplessness to protect the
victims. But the Board found that Galina had been a victim of
persecution notwithstanding the police response to her husband’s
call, and this implies that if she were returned to Latvia and
subjected to the same treatment (or worse–since her persecutors
wanted her out of Latvia, and so may kill her if they can’t keep
her out of the country), it would still be persecution, even if the

270. See, e.g., Olmos-Colaj v. Sessions, 886 F.3d 168, 176 (1st Cir. 2018);
Saldana v. Lynch, 820 F.3d 970, 977 (8th Cir. 2016); Galina v. INS, 213 F.3d
955, 958 (7th Cir. 2000).
271. Matter of A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316, 337 (2018).
272. Galina, 213 F.3d at 955–56.
273. See id.
274. Matter of A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 337 (quoting Galina, 213 F.3d at 958).
275. Galina, 213 F.3d at 958 (emphasis added).
276. See id. at 956 (internal citations omitted).
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police might take some action against telephone threats. 277
The Galina court’s reference to the condones-or-completehelplessness standard is irrelevant to the ultimate holding reversing the
BIA and granting asylum. 278 Indeed, the court’s ultimate holding is that
the Latvian government’s response met the unwilling-or-unable
standard. 279 Examining Galina demonstrates several principles relevant to
both Seventh Circuit posture and Matter of A-B-: (1) the opinion is 21
years old, with no Seventh Circuit case in the past five years using the
heightened standard to determine disposition on a withholding case;280
(2) the Galina opinion reverses the BIA, granting asylum and criticizing
the BIA’s refusal to accept meritorious claims;281 (3) Galina and its
reference to a condones-or-complete-helplessness standard were not
applied to withholding of removal, only asylum;282 (4) the Galina court’s
reference to the heightened standard was dicta; 283 and (5) the Galina court
upheld the BIA’s determination that the government involvement in the
case met the unwilling-or-unable standard for private persecution. 284
The First and Eighth circuits adopted, at least in part, a condones-orcomplete-helplessness standard for private persecution by affirming BIA
decisions applying that standard prior to Matter of A-B-. 285 The Eighth
Circuit adopted the condones-or-complete-helplessness standard in
Saldana v. Lynch, affirming the BIA’s decision denying asylum,
withholding, and CAT relief to applicants fleeing gang violence in their
native Mexico. 286 The Saldana court proclaimed that “an applicant must
show that the government either condones the conduct or is unable to
protect the victims” and that “unable” means “complete helplessness.”287
Like Matter of A-B-, the Saldana court cited Galina for the completehelplessness standard. 288 In Olmos-Colaj v. Sessions, the First Circuit
affirmed a BIA decision denying asylum, withholding, and CAT relief to
277. Id. at 958 (internal citations omitted).
278. See id.
279. See id.
280. See, e.g., Silais v. Sessions, 855 F.3d 736 (7th Cir. 2017) (denying
petition without using heightened standard).
281. See Galina, 213 F.3d at 955–56.
282. See id.
283. See id.
284. See id.
285. See, e.g., Olmos-Colaj v. Sessions, 886 F.3d 168, 176 (1st Cir. 2018);
Saldana v. Lynch, 820 F.3d 970, 977 (8th Cir. 2016).
286. Saldana, 820 F.3d at 973.
287. Id. at 976–77 (citations omitted).
288. Id. at 977.
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applicants fleeing private violence following the Guatemalan Civil War.289
The Olmos-Colaj court found, without citing any authority for a
“condones” standard, that
“[a] petitioner must . . . show that the persecution is the direct
result of government action, government-supported action, or
government's unwillingness or inability to control private
conduct.” Petitioners claim that “[p]ervasive discrimination exists
in all aspects of Guatemalan society [and that] [t]he government
cannot protect Ms. Yolanda and Ms. Consuelo.” However,
substantial evidence supports the BIA’s finding that petitioners
“did not show that the government of Guatemala condoned the
actions of the people that mistreated petitioners or that the
Guatemalan government is unable or unwilling to protect
petitioners from the people that they fear.” 290
Each of these decisions is problematic. The Saldana court’s completehelplessness standard is drawn from a misunderstanding of Galina291 and
has since been adopted into a distinct line of Eighth Circuit caselaw.292
The Olmos-Colaj court merely recites the BIA’s application of a
“condones” standard without any authority to support that standard’s
reasonableness or precedent. 293
Even in circuits that have not adopted Matter of A-B- or some other
iteration of the condones-or-complete-helplessness standard, some require
a home state to do less than provide effective protection: in the Ninth
Circuit, withholding has been denied by a showing that the police did
“anything” to protect an applicant; 294 a separate line of Eighth Circuit
cases has applied heightened standards requiring only that the home nation
is “aggressively combatting” private violence in general, without regard to
whether the state effectively protected a particular withholding
applicant; 295 the First Circuit has denied withholding claims by conflating
289. Olmos-Colaj, 866 F.3d at 171.
290. Id. at 176 (internal citations omitted).
291. See Saldana, 820 F.3d at 977.
292. See, e.g., Galloso v. Barr, 954 F.3d 1189 (8th Cir. 2020); Edionseri v.
Sessions, 860 F.3d 1101 (8th Cir. 2017).
293. See Olmos-Colaj, 866 F.3d at 171.
294. See, e.g., C.J.L.G. v. Sessions, 880 F.3d 1122, 1143 (9th Cir. 2018)
(finding Honduran government not unwilling or unable “because the [country
conditions] report does not support C.J.’s subjective statement that the police
‘couldn’t do anything’”).
295. See, e.g., Martin Martin v. Barr, 916 F.3d 1141, 1144 (8th Cir. 2019)
(quoting Cinto-Velasquez v. Lynch, 817 F.3d 602, 605–06 (8th Cir. 2016)).
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the “acquiescence” standard for CAT relief and finding difficulty
preventing actual harms insufficient; 296 the Tenth Circuit’s only case in
the last ten years determining a withholding claim based on government
inability or unwillingness to protect an applicant from persecution
involved an examination of Indonesian policy aims rather than ability to
effectively protect an applicant from private religious persecution; 297 the
Eleventh Circuit has found that the Cameroonian government was not
unwilling or unable to protect a gay applicant from private homophobic
persecution even though the government itself outlawed homosexuality as
a crime. 298 Each of these lines of caselaw fails to apply the international
standard of effective protection for non-refoulement, violating
international law, U.S. constitutional treaty obligations, and the purpose
of the INA.
At the same time, two circuits have expressly considered and rejected
Matter of A-B- as unreasonable. 299 The D.C. Circuit in Grace v. Barr held
that the Matter of A-B- standard was more difficult to meet than the
statutorily established unwilling-or-unable standard. 300 The Court found
that the AG’s announcement of a new, heightened standard for refugee
claims permitted IJs to choose between application of two unequal
standards based on no discernible criteria whatsoever, and was therefore,
“arbitrary and capricious.” 301
The Sixth Circuit considered and rejected the Matter of A-B- standard
in Antonio v. Barr. 302 The Antonio court stated:
296. See, e.g., Morales-Morales v. Sessions, 857 F.3d 130, 136 (1st Cir. 2017)
(finding an applicant’s fear that police action may not effectively deter harm
insufficient) (citing Ortiz-Araniba v. Keisler, 505 F.3d 39, 42 (1st Cir. 2007) (“An
applicant must show the government’s acquiescence in the persecutor’s act or its
inability or unwillingness to investigate and punish those acts, and not just a
general difficulty preventing the occurrence of particular future crimes.”).
297. Ritonga v. Holder, 633 F.3d 971, 977–78 (10th Cir. 2011) (finding that
“[i]t is true that [the applicant] submitted voluminous documentation of violence
against Christians in various parts of Indonesia over the years. . . . Indeed, the
State Department International Religious Freedom Report 2007 on Indonesia
documents that the Indonesian government ‘sometimes tolerated discrimination
against and the abuse of religious groups by private actors and often failed to
punish perpetrators’” but denying withholding based on Indonesian policy efforts
to minimize religious persecution generally).
298. Sama v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 887 F.3d 1225, 1230 (11th Cir. 2018).
299. Grace v. Barr, 965 F.3d 833, 900 (D.C. Cir. 2020); Antonio v. Barr, 959
F.3d 778, 793, 795 (6th Cir. 2020).
300. Grace, 965 F.3d at 898–900.
301. Id. at 899–900.
302. Antonio, 959 F.3d at 793, 795.
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When an asylum claim focuses on non-governmental conduct, the
applicant must show that the alleged persecutor is either aligned
with the government or that the government is unwilling or unable
to control him. An applicant meets this burden when she shows
that she cannot reasonably expect the assistance of the government
in controlling her perpetrator’s actions. 303
The Antonio court then analyzed the government’s response to
domestic violence in Guatemala, finding its efforts ineffective and
reversing the BIA’s denial of asylum and withholding. 304 In its analysis,
the court briefly considered and rejected the Matter of A-B- standard in
favor of an effective protection standard. 305
That the D.C. and Sixth circuits have rejected Matter of A-B- shows
that not all courts have adopted a heightened condones-or-completehelplessness standard into their caselaw. However, it is noteworthy that
both of these decisions reject the heightened standard as arbitrary and
capricious as applied to asylum. 306 Neither of these cases address the AG’s
lack of discretion in withholding claims, non-refoulement, or the
conflation of asylum and withholding at U.S. law. Indeed, none of the
circuit court cases from the dataset discuss the international law
foundation of withholding and U.S. refugee law generally. None discuss
non-refoulement or Article 33. Grace v. Barr discusses the applicant’s
reliance on the U.N. Handbook, only to reject this reliance because it is
not a dispositive authority. 307 It appears that even circuits rejecting the
Matter of A-B- standard overlook withholding’s connection to the
foundational principle of non-refoulement and its place in the international
and domestic refugee-law framework.

303. Id. at 793.
304. Id.; see also id. at 798 (“Here, the immigration judge and Board relied
solely on their findings regarding asylum to determine that Maria did not meet the
more demanding standard of withholding of removal. Thus, because we remand
for the agency to reconsider Maria’s asylum claim, the Board should also consider
‘whether [Maria is] entitled to withholding of removal based on all of the evidence
on record.’”).
305. See id. at 797 (citiation omitted) (“Further, the Board’s conclusion that
Maria did not meet her burden of showing that the Guatemalan government was
‘helpless’ relies on a standard that has since been deemed arbitrary and
capricious.”).
306. See Grace, 965 F.3d at 899–900 (discussing only asylum); Antonio, 959
F.3d at 793, 797–98 (discussing asylum only and remanding for consideration of
asylum and withholding).
307. Grace, 965 F.3d at 897–98.
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V. CONCLUSIONS, CRITICISMS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS
From mid-twentieth-century multinational treaties to U.S. circuit court
opinions of the past year, this Article has traced non-refoulement and
withholding from its broad principles to its discrete applications and
standards at U.S. law. What have we discovered? First, that nonrefoulement, as established in Article 33 of the 1951 Refugee Convention
and 1967 Protocol, prohibits states from returning refugees to places where
they will likely face persecution. That principle of non-refoulement is
foundational to the international refugee regime and binding upon the
United States at both international law and U.S. constitutional law after
the ratification of the 1967 Protocol. The United States enacted the INA
and the Refugee Act of 1980 to ensure effective compliance with
international refugee law, including non-refoulement. The INA
established withholding of removal as the domestic equivalent of nonrefoulement. Non-refoulement and withholding entitle a refugee to relief
when the refugee’s home state fails to offer effective protection against
private persecution. The AG has discretion to determine asylum standards,
but not withholding. The AG raised the standard for private persecution in
asylum claims and misapplied his authority by announcing the same
heightened standard for withholding. Federal courts often conflate asylum
and withholding, neglecting to engage in separate withholding analysis.
As a result, several circuits have adopted the AG’s unlawful heightened
standard for private persecution to apply to withholding claims. Even after
the AG decision raising private persecution standards was vacated, circuits
that adopted the heightened standard continue to apply it as precedent.
These facts amount to violations of international law, the INA, and the
U.S. Constitution. The 1951 Refugee Convention and 1967 Protocol, the
Travaux Preparatoires to the 1951 Refugee Convention, and U.N.
guidance clearly mandate a broadly applicable principle of nonrefoulement, essentially without exception, requiring effective protection
against private persecution. The Supreme Court has stated multiple times
that the INA’s purpose is to bring the United States into compliance with
those principles of international law. Furthermore, because the United
States has ratified the 1967 Protocol, the Supremacy Clause establishes its
principles, including and especially the foundational principle of nonrefoulement, as the supreme law of the land. 308
At one level, the issue this Article raises is the misapplication of a
heightened condones-or-helplessness standard to private-persecution
withholding claims. Domestic and international law authorities clearly
308. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
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prohibit this standard, which can and does result in denials for meritorious
withholding applications. But this is merely one vantage point from which
to acknowledge the United States’ failure to uphold non-refoulement by
its treatment of withholding relief more generally. The EOIR Fiscal
Yearbooks and one-line dismissals in federal court paint a clear picture:
withholding is the forgotten form of relief in American refugee law. In
some ways this makes sense: asylum provides a greater form of relief
(naturalization), and its threshold for likelihood of harm is lower. And yet,
withholding is the American enactment of the most core principle of
refugee law. It is the central promise of international and domestic refugee
law: provide refuge, provide shelter from the storm.
Some may argue that as widespread domestic and gang violence
continues in Central and South America and Mexico, requiring effective
protection from governments struggling to control private violence will
result in a rash of successful withholding claims. Would applying the
condones-or-complete-helplessness standard not: (1) provide a more
realistic expectation for those governments to control private violence and
(2) help defend against a flood of immigration? These arguments fail.
First, refugee law requires that states actually protect their citizens
from persecution. Requiring nothing more than a good-faith effort, due to
particular circumstances within a nation or group of nations, is wholly
inconsistent with any interpretation of non-refoulement. Regarding floods
of immigration, the constitutional requirement to observe treaty provisions
does not fluctuate with social convenience. It would provide an objectively
practical safety advantage in combatting gun violence to outlaw all
firearms in our country, but the Second Amendment does not disappear
due to social convenience. Similarly, as socially pragmatic as some may
find denying a greater number of refugee claims, the Constitution
mandates that we adhere to non-refoulement. What is more, the entire
refugee law regime was built to address mass refugee crises in midtwentieth-century Europe. Rejecting internationally established standards
for non-refoulement and withholding of removal due to practical concerns
about floods of refugees stands in sharp contrast to the concerns and aims
from which this area of law was born.
In Shelter from the Storm, a wistful Dylan laments “if only I could turn
back the clock to when God and her were born.”309 So how can we turn
back the clock to when non-refoulement was born as a lawful and adheredto principle of international and domestic law? The answer is fairly
straightforward: a separate withholding analysis applying the effectiveprotection standard for every private-persecution withholding claim across
309. DYLAN, supra note 2.
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every U.S. jurisdiction. In doing so, American courts would respect
constitutional treaty obligations and the INA by evaluating withholding
claims under international standards. Evaluating all withholding claims
under the internationally recognized standard for private persecution
would help to alleviate disparities and inconsistencies across U.S.
jurisdictions and clarifies international standards for protecting citizenry
from private persecution. Syncing domestic practice with international law
can also help the United States resume its place as a leader in the
international human rights community: as the delegation arguing for the
strongest possible principle of non-refoulement in 1951 and the land
Emma Lazarus described in 1893.

